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INTRODUCTION
Not all investors are rational. Quite apart from the obvious examples of
credulity in the face of the latest Ponzi scheme, there is no shortage of evidence
that many investors' decisions are influenced by systematic biases that impair
their abilities to maximize their investment returns. l For example, investors
will often hold onto poorly performing stocks longer than warranted, hoping to
recoup their losses. 2 Other investors will engage in speculative trading,
dissipating their returns by paying larger commissions than more passive
investors. 3 And we are not just talking about widows and orphans here. There
is evidence that supposedly sophisticated institutional investors-mutual funds,
pension funds, insurance companies-suffer from similar biases that impair
their decisions. 4 These biases are not merely isolated quirks, rather, they are
consistent, deep-rooted, and systematic behavioral patterns. Apparently even
the considerable sums at stake in the securities markets are not enough to
induce market participants to overcome these cognitive defects on a consistent
basis.
Not surprisingly, these findings of scholars working at the intersection of
psychology and economics have recently found their way into legal
scholarship. This burgeoning trend has come to be called "behavioral law and
1. For a useful survey, see David A. Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset
Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 1533 (2001).
2. See Terrence Odean, Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?, 53 J. FIN.
1775 (1998) (finding that investors were more willing to sell winning positions than losing
ones, despite tax advantages); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition To Sell
Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 788
(1985) (developing a behavioral model of loss aversion due to, among others, "mental
accounting, regret aversion, and self-control" and providing evidence that tax considerations
alone cannot explain patterns of loss realization).
3. See Brad M. Barber & Terrence Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000)
(finding that more active traders tend to have lower returns); Terrence Odean, Do Investors
Trade Too Much?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1279 (1999) (providing evidence that the trading
volume on the part of those with discount brokerage accounts is excessive in the sense that
the returns from such trades do not outweigh the transaction costs). Odean, indeed, provides
evidence that the trading returns for those with discount brokerage accounts are negative
irrespective of transaction costs. See id. at 1283-84.
4. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text (discussing the behavioral biases
afflicting securities market institutions).
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economics."'5 Behavioral law and economics is defined primarily by what it
rejects: the rational actor model that is the fundamental premise of conventional
law and economics. The rational actor model postulates that individuals
shrewdly calculate the course of action that will maximize their wealth and
utility.6 This presumption is bolstered in market settings, where economically
minded commentators commonly assume that the most rational will dominate
in competition with those less cognitively able.
In the context of the securities markets the rational actor model has
considerably less Darwinian implications than one might suppose. Under the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 7 the "smart" money will set prices and
through the process of arbitrage will swamp the influence of the poorly
informed or foolish. Even the unsophisticated therefore can rely on market
efficiency to ensure that the price he pays for a security will be "fair." More
importantly, the unsophisticated can accomplish their investment goals by
passively tracking the overall market without evaluating individual companies
and the securities that they issue. 8 Far from weeding out unsophisticated
investors, the overwhelming influence of smart money actually indirectly
protects the interests of the poorly informed, as evidenced by the burgeoning
popularity of index funds.9
The more provocative implication of the efficient market hypothesis is that
government regulation of financial intermediaries and companies' financial
disclosures may be unnecessary and potentially wasteful. Investors will price
legal protections-or the lack thereof-when valuing securities. If financial
intermediaries do not give credible assurances that they will not abuse their
customers' trust, investors will not entrust them with their investment dollars.
And if companies do not give credible assurances that they will disclose
truthfully the information that investors rely upon to value securities, those
companies will pay substantial risk premia (thereby compensating investors for
the risk of fraud) or be unable to sell their securities altogether. We confess to
5. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
6. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 761
(1973) ("The basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people
involved with the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions.").
7. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (providing a survey of theoretical implications of efficient
markets and empirical testing of the efficient markets hypothesis).
8. Some finance theorists argue that markets are not efficient due to the presence of
"noise traders" who trade not based on information but rather due to liquidity needs. See,
e.g., J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann,
Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 713, 717 (1990).
9. The authors share this faith: Our retirement savings are indexed. Of course, the
popularity of index funds may reflect regret aversion as investors are more likely to regret
poor investments when they are actively involved in making those choices. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 ScI. AM. 160 (1982)
(finding that individuals suffered greater regret from decisions involving action rather than
inaction).
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having penned a few lines of this sort ourselves in prior work. 10
Adherents to behavioral law and economics are not so sanguine about
investors' capacity to fend for themselves. They argue that arbitrage will not
drive irrationality from the market but instead may fuel it: "Arbitrage is a
double-edged blade: Just as rational investors arbitrage away inefficient
pricing, foolish traders arbitrage away efficient pricing."11 If mispricing is a
persistent phenomenon, the behavioralists fear that investors left to the mercies
of unscrupulous brokers and corporate executives will be systematically
fleeced. Rejecting the laissez-faire normative outlook that underlies much law
and economics scholarship, the behavioral economics school generally
subscribes to an "anti-antipatemalism."' 12 As any high school English teacher
no doubt could translate, this means a belief in the benefit of "patemalism."' 13
In the context of the securities regulation, this faith has a quite tangible object
of worship: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Several commentators use the evidence of cognitive defects among
investors to justify preserving and expanding the role of the SEC.14 In the
10. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41
VA. J. INT'L L. 815 (2001); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998);
A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges
as Securities Fraud Monitors, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999).
11. Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 1536. Moreover, arbitrage is costly, which may limit
its effect on correcting mispricing. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The
Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997) (discussing possible anomalies in the financial
markets and why arbitrage fails to counter such anomalies).
12. Cass R. Sunstein, Looking Forward: Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1178 (1997) (noting that his "anti-antipaternalism" view does not necessarily
lead to paternalism, but nonetheless requires that "objections to paternalism should be
empirical and pragmatic, having to do with the possibility of education and likely failures of
government response, rather than a priori in nature").
13. It is hard to ignore the ideological tenor of this work. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51
EMORY L.J. 309, 318 (2002) ("Political conservatives are especially inclined to discount
psychological excuses and project onto the world an unrealistic level of intentionality.")
(citing Philip Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease
and Cure Depend on the Politics of the Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 293 (2000)); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CINN. L. REV.
1023, 1027 (2000) ("[I]t seems probable that behavior economics increasingly will be
invoked by those who favor government intervention precisely because behavioral
economics offers a new line of argument in favor of regulating private conduct."); Philip E.
Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate, 13 PSYCHOL. Sci. 94, 97
(2002) ("It should not be surprising that Kahneman and Tversky's research program is more
enthusiastically embraced by economists on the left, who have long doubted that markets are
infallibly self-correcting and suspected that people sometimes need to be protected from
themselves, than by economists on the laissez-faire right, who worry about what kind of
'micro' case is not being manufactured for new meddlesome forms of government
intervention.").
14. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (proposing to reform various aspects of securities
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absence of government regulation, greedy promoters will step into the void to
prey on the cognitive defects of investors. Particular scorn is directed toward
proposals to substitute market regulation for SEC oversight. 15 Market
participants, the argument goes, will not precommit to regulatory protections to
win the trust of investors but will instead manipulate investors' biases
systematically to enrich themselves. 16 Competition cannot be relied upon to
promote investor welfare because of the systematic nature of the biases. The
small investor cannot count on the smart money to demand fair treatment for all
investors-the smart money suffers from the same set of biases. Only
government intervention can protect investors from their own cognitive defects.
While we think the magnitude of investor biases is open to question, 17 we
focus on a different question here: If cognitive defects are pervasive, will
intervention help? Even well-intentioned and fully rational regulators may find
it difficult to solve the problem of cognitive illusions among investors.
Disclosure, the prevailing regulatory strategy in the securities markets, may not
protect investors if cognitive biases prevent them from rationally incorporating
the information disclosed into their investment decisions. More fundamentally,
if everyone suffers from cognitive defects, doesn't that also include the
commissioners and staff of the SEC?
Regulators may respond that their expertise shields them from some
cognitive illusions. The work of behavioral economists, however, shows that
experts may fall prey to their own set of biases. 18 Moreover, regulators do not
face the same competitive pressures that investors and other securities market
participants do. 19 Those competitive forces may help mitigate behavioral biases
regulation to take into account insights from behavioral finance); Robert Prentice, Whither
Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future,
51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1400 (2001) (stating his belief that "that American securities regulation
is the optimal system for governing capital markets").
15. See Prentice, supra note 14 (casting scorn on both Choi and Pritchard's prior
market-based proposals); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the
Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135,
153 (2003) ("Behavioral finance can be invoked as a counterweight, to demonstrate the costs
and risks of [deregulatory] proposals under an arguably more realistic view of how markets
behave.") [hereinafter Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits].
16. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from
Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV.
627, 648-67 (1996) (detailing how brokers may manipulate both individual and institutional
investor biases for the brokers' own opportunistic ends) [hereinafter Langevoort, Selling
Hope].
17. We address some of these magnitude questions infra Part I.C.
18. We discuss the biases facing "expert" SEC regulators infra Part I.
19. See Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Investor Psychology in
Capital Markets: Evidence and Policy Implications 3 (Aug. 3, 2001), (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=278848 ("Individual political
participants are not immune to the biases and self-interest exhibited in private settings....
Indeed, the economic incentives of officials to overcome their biases in evaluating
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among investors and securities professionals (at the very least forcing out of the
market those with the greatest levels of cognitive difficulties). Regulators, by
contrast, generally enjoy monopolies in their field, which immunizes them from
the stringent constraints of the market that might force corrections in decision
making flaws. If biases are universal, do regulators suffer more or less from
those biases than investors? Markets deal harshly with fools; our cynical side
worries that government affords a safe haven.
Not all commentators applying behavioral insights to securities regulations
call unquestioningly for government intervention to correct for market-based
biases. The possibility of regulator biases has led some to question the wisdom
of regulation as a solution for market-based biases.20 For those attempting to
take into account regulator behavioral biases, the question nonetheless remains:
How should policymakers weigh investors' behavioral biases against those
affecting regulators? Obviously perfect regulation trumps an imperfect market.
But we do not face this choice. Instead, we propose a framework for assessing
regulation to correct for market biases. A cautious approach is warranted in this
area because regulators themselves typically make the decision whether to
intervene in the market. Overconfidence (or more mundane public choice
reasons) may cause regulators to ignore their own behavioral limitations and
push toward excessive intervention. Regulatory intervention to correct for
biases also poses the very real danger of regulatory mistake. Once in place, new
regulatory protections often take a life of their own, so even if regulations are
ill conceived, they become difficult to displace. The market corrects its
mistakes; regulators frequently resist doing so. Indeed, focusing on the
behavioral problems of investors without also addressing the problems among
regulators may lead to a perverse result. Investors-to the extent they are
capable of learning and adjusting to cognitive limitations through feedback in
the market-may come to rely (mistakenly) on regulators to protect them from
fundamental value are likely to be weaker than the incentives of market participants. So
government efforts to correct market perceptions are likely to waste resources and increase
ex ante uncertainty.").
20. See Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND.
L. REv. 1765, 1769 (1998) ("Proposals designed to address biases generally entail the
intervention of judges, legislators, or bureaucrats who are also subject to various biases. The
very power of the behavioralist critique-that even educated people exhibit certain biases-
thus undercuts efforts to redress such biases."); Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 1057-58
("[L]egislators and regulators are no less subject to bounded rationality and other cognitive
biases than any other decisionmakers."); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of
Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L.
REv. 1499, 1519 (1998) ("Less attention has been devoted to whether courts or regulators
are likely to be biased along the lines suggested in the behavioral literature, perhaps because
bureaucratic activity seems more organizational than individual."). For a more general
account of the behavioral biases affecting government officials, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski &
Cynthia R. Farina, New Theories of the Regulatory State: Cognitive Psychology and Optimal
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549 (2002) (discussing the role expertise has in
both reducing cognitive errors in some ways and increasing errors in others).
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themselves, 21 diminishing the market's ability to overcome behavioral biases
on its own. We therefore argue that regulations designed to remove investment
choices from individual decisionmaking require very strong justification. Other
forms of regulatory interventions disrupt markets less. So, for example, we are
more open to regulations intended to assist investors in overcoming their
behavioral biases. Investor education might be one such intervention.
Part I summarizes some of the cognitive defects found by psychologists
and reviews the evidence that these defects affect the financial markets. Part II
applies the insights of behavioral economics to the SEC (and other regulators).
Part III sets forth a framework for comparing SEC and market-based responses
to cognitive biases. A short conclusion summarizes our main points.
I. THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO SECURITIES REGULATION
Some call behavioral law and economics the growth stock of legal
academia,22 a contention borne out by the increasing number of articles
employing the behavioral approach. 23 A common theme runs through this
literature: It is simply wrong to assume that people act rationally with every
decision. 24 In this Part we (A) discuss biases in the context of investors; (B)
discuss alternative explanations for investor behavior (including a preference
for speculation); and (C) comment on the possible magnitude of behavioral
biases among investors.
A. Investor Biases
What biases plague human decisionmaking? Psychologists have identified
a long list, including the hindsight bias, 25 the (flawed) reliance on heuristics 26
21. Indeed, investors may themselves become overconfident in the ability of regulators
to provide airtight protections, leading to perhaps even greater investor losses. See
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 15, at 175 (citing Henry T.C. Hu, Faith
and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777 (2000)).
22. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 583 (2002) ("If
one could invest in areas of legal scholarship, 'behavioral law and economics' (BLE) would
be a growth stock.").
23. As a crude test, we performed a Westlaw search among law review articles for the
word "behavioral" in the title. There were 14 articles listing 2001 as the publication year
compared with only 6 listing 1997.
24. It is hard to quarrel with this proposition; rational choice economists have always
conceded that this fundamental assumption was a crude, albeit useful, simplification. See
MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3-43 (1953).
25. The hindsight bias describes the tendency to place too great a weight on events that
actually did occur in the past (rather than events that might have occurred but did not) in
predicting the probability of events. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to
Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J.
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(including the availability heuristic), 27 the presence of overconfidence and
overoptimism, 28 the endowment effect (and other framing related biases), 29 and
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (discussing
evidence of the hindsight bias). Similarly, people tend to give too little weight to large
samples and too much weight to small samples in drawing inferences on the characteristics
of an overall population. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of
Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23-24 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovik & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) ("[P]eople view a sample randomly
drawn from a population as highly representative, that is, similar to the population in all
essential characteristics. Consequently, they expect any two samples drawn from a particular
population to be more similar to one another and to the population than sampling theory
predicts ...."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 ScI. 1124, 1124-31 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty].
26. People may use heuristic shortcuts to manage large quantities of information
(operating under bounded rationality). Heuristics, of course, are not always inaccurate.
Indeed, their survival over time provides some evidence that heuristics provide a cost-
effective way of arriving at an answer that generally will be correct. In specific situations,
however, heuristics may lead users astray. For example, people are more willing to accept
the truth of a statement that is easy to understand (the "illusion of truth"). See Rolf Reber &
Norbert Schwarz, Effects of Perceptual Fluency on Judgments of Truth, 8 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 338 (1999) (providing empirical evidence that "any variable that increases
experienced ease of processing is also likely to increase judgments of truth"). Once
heuristics become entrenched, people may be unable to discern when a heuristic is
inappropriate for a particular situation.
27. Under the availability heuristic, people place undue weight on recent events and
other readily available information. The availability heuristic may lead people to discount
excessively the possibility of losses from high magnitude but low probability risks if such a
loss has not occurred recently. Conversely, immediately after a loss does occur (for example,
an earthquake in San Francisco or a financial meltdown at Enron), people may exaggerate
the probability of future loss. See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty,
supra note 25, at 1127-28 (describing the availability heuristic).
28. Experts, in particular, may also develop a sense of overconfidence, leading to a
countervailing increase in errors. See Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of
Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992).
Experience may or may not help increase analyst forecast accuracy. Compare John Jacob,
Thomas Z. Lys & Margaret A Neale, Expertise in Forecasting Performance of Security
Analysts, 28 J. ACCT. & ECON. 51 (1999) (providing evidence that analyst forecast accuracy
does not increase with experience), with Michael B. Mikhail, Beverly R. Walther & Richard
Willis, The Development of Expertise: Do Security Analysts Improve their Performance with
Experience?, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 131 (1997) (finding a statistically significant decline in
analyst forecast errors as their firm-specific experience increases). Overconfidence does not
necessarily correlate with less wealthy investors. In investment markets, success itself may
lead traders to develop overconfidence. See Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, Learning To
Become Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 2 (2001) ("Overconfidence does not make
traders wealthy, but the process of becoming wealthy can make traders overconfident.").
Overoptimism is a closely related bias. See MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL
DECISION MAKING 37-39 (3d ed. 1994); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About
Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). Some amount of
overoptimism, of course, can be useful. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and
Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
739, 760 (2000) (noting that "[p]sychologists have shown, for example, that, only clinically
depressed people make accurate predictions about their likelihood of success").
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the confirmation bias. 30 Several commentators have attempted to categorize the
29. The endowment effect describes the greater value that people place on things
presently in their possession. See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (setting forth the endowment effect theory).
People frequently demand more to sell an item than they would be willing to pay for the
same item. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (providing
evidence from an experimental setting that the endowment effect persists even when parties
are given the opportunity to learn). In other words, the framing of the question (whether to
buy or sell the same item) may affect the valuation of an item. The magnitude of the
endowment effect, however, may vary with the context. Jennifer Arlen, Matt Spitzer, and
Eric Talley have shown that framing a relationship as an agency appears to reduce the
overall impact of the endowment effect for the agent-decisionmaker. See Jennifer Arlen,
Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships,
31 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 31 (2002) (noting that their results "are largely consistent with the
hypothesis that situating subjects in an agency context mutes the endowment effect because
the subjects focus on the exchange value of the entitlements for trade."); see also Russell
Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1238 (2003)
(noting that the endowment effect is reduced for products with close market substitutes)
(citing Jason F. Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein,
Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
255, 259-64 (1994)). Securities, of course, would be a paradigm of such a good. See
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 345 (5th
ed. 1996).
Endowment effects are related to loss aversion, which describes the phenomenon of
people valuing the avoidance of a loss much higher than an improvement of the same
magnitude over their current position. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss
Aversion and Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991)
(providing a model of consumer choice where the value of gains and losses depends on a
person's reference point); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analsyis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (noting that the tendency of
people to overweight certain outcomes and underweight probabilistic outcomes may lead
people to accept overly high risks in the hopes of avoiding a certain loss). Loss aversion
informs people's notions of fairness: People are more offended by shifts away from the
norms in transactions that result in harm to consumers and workers than by failures to
improve the terms of trade for those individuals. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch &
Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1985); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler,
Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285 (1986). People may have a
general bias toward the status quo. See William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status
Quo Bias in Decision Making, I J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
30. The confirmation bias induces people to confirm prior decisions regardless of
whether the decisions were correct when made. See, e.g., Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson,
George R. Neumann & Jack Wright, Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market, 82
AM. ECON. REV. 1142 (1992); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). For example,
suppose an individual makes an ill-advised decision to purchase an expensive convertible to
drive himself to work. Even after discovering that the costs of such a car in the Michigan
winter far outweigh the benefits, the person may then invent new perceived benefits (such as
how good Frank Sinatra sounds on the swell stereo) to justify the purchase. And he may fail
to recognize some of the costs attributable to the car, such as his daughter's increased
number of colds from sitting in the back seat of this drafty vehicle. See Langevoort, Taming
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biases. 3 1 Despite efforts at categorization, no underlying theory behind why we
operate under biases has emerged.32 Instead of a theory, behavioral economics
relies on a hodgepodge of evidence showing the ineffectiveness of human
decisionmaking in various circumstances (often in a controlled, laboratory
setting). 33 Many questions therefore remain unanswered including: (a) how can
the Animal Spirits, supra note 15, at 142 ("Once a person voluntarily commits to an idea or
course of action, there is a strong motivation to resist evidence that it was ill-chosen.").
Pritchard has just recently made this ill-advised choice and has not yet born the adverse
consequences requiring rationalization. His unfortunate daughter will just have to bundle up
come winter.
31. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler ("JST") classify behavioral
biases according to the qualification that the behavioral bias imposes on the rational man
assumption: bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest. See
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-80 (1998) (noting that "[e]ach of these bounds
represents a significant way in which most people depart from the standard economic
model"). While useful descriptively, JST's grouping does not move us forward in
determining biases' underlying causes. JST offer no theory of how we process information.
Rather, JST simply group empirically similar phenomena together (based on their impact on
the rational man assumption). One could similarly group birds and airplanes together (both
can fly) without explaining how birds and airplanes remain airborne.
Jeffrey Rachlinski classifies behavioral biases based on their source within the human
brain's information processing apparatus. See Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 750-52.
Rachlinski identifies three categories of biases: (1) overoptimism, the fact that people act as
if their abilities and memory are limitless when in fact there are limits; (2) heuristics, short-
cuts that people use without being aware of them; and (3) people's tendency to react to
things in a relative way (rather than an absolute way) in making decisions. See id.
Rachlinski's division sheds light on the origins of behavioral biases. Our brains' tendencies
to act without limits, take short cuts, and interpret phenomena in a relative manner lead to
systematic behavioral biases. Rachlinski's division, nonetheless fails to explain why our
brains in fact process information in this manner.
Yet other ways of organizing the myriad biases are possible. See Hal R. Arkes, Costs
and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486,
486-87 (1991) (dividing behavioral biases into strategy, associational, and psychophysically
based errors and contending that the benefits obtained from the biases generally outweigh
the costs of the biases).
32. See Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 1035 ("To date, behavioral economics has not
(and may not ever) develop a single theory that explains or predicts the full range of human
behavior, as rational choice theory claims to do. Instead, it offers a pragmatic collection of
'situation-specific mini-theories useful in the analysis of discrete legal problems."'); Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1560-61 (1998) (contending that proponents of behavioral economics "have no theory, but
merely a set of challenges to the theory-builders, who in the relevant instances are rational-
choice economists and, I am about to suggest, evolutionary biologists").
33. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 715 (1999) (noting that
"behavioral research remains a somewhat haphazard collection of seemingly unrelated
cognitive quirks .... Drawing legal conclusions for a topic like consumer risk perception
then becomes primarily a game of 'who has the most anomalies wins"'). Whether these
experimental results can be duplicated in business settings is open to question. See Arlen et
al., supra note 29 (providing an experimental test for the importance of endowment effect for
individuals situated in an agency relationship and finding little evidence of the effect). For a
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we measure the magnitude of the various bounded aspects of rationality and (b)
what effect will particular regulatory reforms have in overcoming people's
bounded nature (if this is even a desirable policy goal). 34 How do we
ameliorate such biases if we don't understand their origins or how they respond
to various policy levers? The lack of a developed theory is not so much a fault
of the behavioral school as it is a sign that the school is still in its infancy.35
Nonetheless, it does suggest that legal scholars should use behavioral
economics with caution. 36
Despite these gaps, various legal scholars have taken insights from
behavioral law and economics and applied them to the securities markets. 37
Some have written, for example, that investors often act with overconfidence in
their investment abilities. 38 Investing encompasses a wide range of choices,
including the type of risk an investor is willing to bear, the class of financial
product (for example, bonds versus equity) in which the investor will place his
money, and within that class, which instruments provide the best return for a
comment on the value of the experimental data, see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72 (2002) ("Behavioral law and economics bases its
model of bounded rationality on a very limited set of empirical data and draws unsupportable
conclusions about human nature from this partial data set.").
34. And what if some of the biases are countervailing, effectively canceling each other
out? See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 33, at 689 ("Kahneman and Tversky's decisionmaker
may be subject to conflicting biases. For instance, the endowment effect may cause one to
want to retain an asset that is dropping in market value while the maxim of loss aversion
counsels abandonment.").
35. See Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 752 ("Because the field is still new, [behavioral
decision theory] sometimes appears to be a loose collection of aberrations, but researchers in
the field are working toward developing general theories of human judgment and choice.").
But see Posner, supra note 32, at 1552 (arguing that "behavioral economics is ...
antitheoretical"). Posner provides an evolutionary biology explanation of the source of at
least some seemingly irrational forms of behavior. See id. at 1561-64. Posner theorizes that
much of what is irrational today would have been perfectly rational in a prelaw society
where people tended to live (and stay isolated with) a small group of close relatives and were
motivated out of desire to see as many of their genes as possible move on to the next
generation. Thus, altruism makes sense when the recipients of such kindness tended to be
close genetic relatives. See id. at 1561.
36. See Mitchell, supra note 33, at 127 (arguing that "legal scholars who have no
training in the social sciences or who have only a superficial understanding of behavioral
decision theory should refrain from the unaided application of behavioral decision theory to
the law"). Rachlinski is similarly critical of "[l]egal scholars who use [behavioral decision
theory because they] have unfortunately presented the field as if it had little or no order,
logic, underlying theory, or limiting principles." Rachlinski, supra note 28, at 750.
37. The tendency to rush toward regulatory solutions when it comes to behavioral
problems in the capital markets is not one shared among all commentators taking the
behavioral economics approach. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
38. As one example, Robert Prentice worries that investors will be overconfident in
their abilities as traders, a problem exacerbated by the illusion of control, leading them to
ignore the statistical evidence that active traders tend to trail market averages. See Prentice,
supra note 14, at 1459-60.
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given risk level. 39 Commentators have argued that investors often do not
recognize how difficult these choices are and instead rely on a belief that their
innate abilities will lead to a good investment result. 40 The large number of day
traders as the bull market peaked in the late 1990s supports the overconfidence
hypothesis. 41 Empirical work, moreover, has found that male traders,
particularly younger men, trade more frequently than other groups of traders. 42
More trading led to lower returns for these overconfident young men.43
Similarly risky behavior can be seen in the heavy investments that people make
in their employers' stock, an obvious mistake from the perspective of
diversification. 44 Overoptimism implies that investors may neglect disclosure
provisions intended to protect them from poor investments.
More generally, investors are often simply poor judges of probabilities. 45
Investors may suffer from the availability heuristic, unduly emphasizing recent
events. Investors may underweigh low probability, high magnitude risks if no
obvious examples of the risk have recently been brought to their attention. On
the flip side, once a big event happens-such as the Enron scandal-investors
may overreact, emphasizing the risk of fraud unduly.46 Immediately after the
Enron and WorldCom scandals in the United States, the net volume of money
flowing into mutual funds actually turned negative for a period of time, even
though the holders of diversified mutual funds are unlikely to suffer any
significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular company.47
39. This last decision may not be all that important, given that "the capital asset pricing
model[] collapses the investment choice into one attribute-the security's sensitivity to
changes in the expected rate of return on the market portfolio (the stock beta)." Roberta
Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications
for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 325 (1986).
40. See, e.g., Jonathan Clements, The Stock Market Isn't as Bad as You Think: The
Right Moves for Tough Times, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at DI (noting that
"[o]verconfident investors also attributed those gains to their own investment savvy, leading
them to become even bolder in their investment bets").
41. See Aaron Elstein, Yes, Day Traders Still Exist, They Just Keep a Lower Profile,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at D4 (estimating 400,000 people engaged in day trading at the
height of the bull market).
42. See Brad Barber & Terrence Odean, Boys Will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence,
and Common Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261 (2001) (providing evidence based on a
sample of 35,000 households that men trade 45% more than women and experience lower
returns).
43. See id.
44. See Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id= 199314 (providing evidence that
investors tend to overly concentrate their portfolio investments in familiar companies).
45. See Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 1545-46.
46. See Peter Klibanoff, Owen Lamony & Thierry A. Wizman, Investor Reaction to
Salient News in Closed-end Country Funds, 53 J. FIN. 673 (1999) (finding that investors
react more strongly to events reported in the New York Times).
47. See Shaheen Pasha, Redemptions Aren't Lone Villain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002,
at D13 (reporting that "investors pulled a net $28.47 billion from stock funds in July, beating
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Framing effects may also impair investor decisionmaking. When investors'
stocks have lost value, they may hold onto the stocks longer than warranted in
hope of reversing the losses. 48  Conversely, investors that make large
investment gains may not value the gains as highly, taking on added risk with
their gains (treating the gains much like "house" money in a casino).4 9
Investors, like everyone else, need to be able to live with their decisions.
Commentators have argued that investors will often experience cognitive
dissonance, rationalizing their prior investment decision no matter how poor
the returns. 50 Such cognitive dissonance may then lead investors to delay
selling poor investments. Biases that discourage selling may deter investors
from the rational strategy of realizing losses for tax purposes at the earliest
opportunity. The need to maintain self-esteem may prevent investors from
learning from their mistakes, attributing their failures to chance rather than their
own decisionmaking limitations. 5 1 Successes, of course, will be attributed to
investment skill. 52
Investors may also fail to process all relevant information on a particular
security, employing heuristics and satisficing.5 3 Rather than read a voluminous
prospectus, an investor may rely simply on the identity of the managing
underwriters, applying a heuristic that well-known underwriters often equate to
lower risk offerings. 54 Even well-known underwriters, of course, cannot
even the $23.6 billion in withdrawals that... were made in September following the terrorist
attacks").
48. See Shefrin & Statman, supra note 2, at 785-88 (reporting evidence that investors
sell gain stock too quickly and hold on to loss stock too long compared to the optimal
holding period from a tax perspective).
49. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 40, at DI (noting that "[t]his increased appetite for
risk was further bolstered by the 'house money' effect. Like casino gamblers who get lucky
early in the evening, investors made so much money that they felt they could take a few
extra chances. After all, even if they lost a little, they would still have handsome profits.");
see also Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang, Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion and
Individual Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 1247 (2001) (arguing that investors are loss averse with
regard to individual stocks as well as their overall portfolio); Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang
& Tano Santos, Prospect Theory andAsset Prices, 66 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2001) (arguing that risk
aversion will be reduced after the revelation of good news that increases the price of a
stock); Richard Thaler & E.J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying to
Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 199 (1990)
(finding that people are more willing to take on risks with money that was recently won).
50. See Langevoort, Selling Hope, supra note 16, at 659-60.
51. See id. at 639.
52. See id.
53. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99
(1955) (postulating a rational choice model under which actors have limited knowledge and
ability); see also supra notes 26-27 (citing sources on heuristics).
54. Some truth, of course, may attach to the underwriter-quality heuristic. See Richard
B. Carter, Frederick H. Dark & Ajai K. Singh, Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and
the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285 (1998) (providing updated list of
the Carter-Manaster rankings of underwriters); Richard B. Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial
Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1056-66 (1990) (developing a
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guarantee against fraud, so investors following such a heuristic may
underestimate their true risk of encountering fraud.
Investors may also fall prey to fads. During the Internet frenzy, firms that
announced that they were changing their name to include "dot.com"
experienced abnormal returns, regardless of whether the announcement
coincided with a change in business plan.55 After the Internet bubble popped,
companies eliminating "dot.com" from their names also enjoyed abnormal
returns. 5
6
After perusing the growing behavioral finance literature, we wonder how
investors are able to make any positive return from the market. Indeed, one
proponent of the behavioral approach to finance, Robert Prentice, has observed
that reading the literature may leave one with the impression that investors are
"dunderheaded. ' ' 57 Prentice quickly qualifies this impression with the notation
that "not all heuristics and biases apply at all times and in all settings to all
investors,"58 but he fails to offer any guidance on when biases do in fact apply.
We-and policymakers who must make regulatory choices-are left to guess.
B. Biases or Preferences?
In order to evaluate investors' rationality, we must first consider a more
fundamental question: Why do investors invest? The commonsense answer
from the rational actor framework is that individuals use investments to smooth
their incomes to match their consumption patterns. 59 Dollars are saved in high-
income years so that consumption can be maintained in low-income years, (for
example, retirement) or heavy expenditure years (for example, sending the
children to college). Unfortunately, the data reflect substantial deviations from
this model. 60 Most conspicuously, investors trade much more frequently than
ranking of underwriters based on their position on an offering "tombstone" announcement
and finding that higher ranking underwriters correlate with lower risk offerings).
Nonetheless, the question remains whether investors can accurately assess the precise risk of
fraud even with a high reputation underwriter.
55. See Michael J. Cooper, Orlin Dimitrov & P. Raghavendra Rau, A Rose.com by Any
Other Name, 56 J. FIN. 2371 (2001) (finding a 74% positive cumulative abnormal return for
companies adding "dot.com" to their name regardless of the companies actual involvement
with the Internet).
56. See Ken Brown, For Dot-Corns, New Names Are Good for a Pop, WALL ST. J.,
DEC. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting results of follow-up study by Cooper et al.).
57. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1489.
58. Id.
59. This intuition is closely related to the life cycle hypothesis, under which consumers
attempt to smooth out their consumption over their lifetime. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A
THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION (1957).
60. See W.F.M. Debondt & R.H. Thaler, Financial Decision-Making in Markets and
Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 FINANCE HANDBOOKS IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND
MANGAGEMENT SCIENCE 385-410 (R.A. Jarrow, V. Maksimovic & W.T. Ziembe, eds.,
1995).
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would be required to satisfy liquidity needs and adjust their portfolios to match
their risk preferences. What explains all this trading?
The behavioralists, as related above, provide one explanation-
overconfidence in one's own abilities. An alternative explanation is that many
investors view the stock market as a substitute for gambling.6 1 Many middle
class individuals-who view lotteries as a foolish waste of money-may be
engaged in similar behavior with their investments. They are pursuing the "next
Microsoft," hoping against the odds that they will become rich enough to leave
their everyday jobs and lifestyles behind. At bottom, we suspect, is a utility
function that favors a remote chance of striking it rich over the slow but steady
gains from buying and holding a well-diversified portfolio.62 We do not share
this speculative preference for our own investments, 63 but we cannot dismiss it
as irrational. 64
If regulators seek to protect investors from themselves and those who
would prey on their weaknesses, regulators must first identify the specific
ailments afflicting investors. Regulations designed to address behavioral biases
may not help investors with speculative preferences. Indeed,. these investors
may enjoy their speculative investments. If so, it is hardly obvious that
government should interfere with this preference, particularly if investors resent
the interference. Moreover, investors may all have some level of speculative
preference and suffer from some cognitive defects, but it seems more plausible
that the magnitude of such effects varies. Some segment of investors may seek
to maximize their return (given the risk).65 Other investors may act equally
rationally but with a greater (and perhaps unwise) preference to engage in
speculation. And still other investors face behavioral biases that impair their
ability to process information and make decisions. Different regulatory
61. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 613-67 (1995) (contending that
trading volume often represents speculative trades on the part of investors with
heterogeneous expectations on the value of companies).
62. Ed McCaffery discusses this theory in the context of lotteries. See Edward J.
McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why It Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 71; see also
Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001) (drawing parallels
between gambling and speculative trading).
63. Both Choi and Pritchard put all their investment dollars into index funds. It's very
boring.
64. Behavioral biases, of course, may feed the speculative instinct. The salience of Bill
Gate's success may obscure the much greater probability that a start-up venture will fail; the
illusion of control in investing may lead these speculative investors to be overconfident of
their chances of success; self-justification may cause them to attribute their past investment
successes to skill while attributing their investment failures to chance. Nonetheless, the urge
to speculate cannot be dismissed as entirely the product of bias.
65. Warren Buffett might be the paradigm of this approach. In 1997 the Cardozo Law
Review held a symposium in honor of Warren Buffett. See Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Introduction to the Warren Buffett Symposium Papers, 19 CARDoZO L. REV. 221 (1997)
(surveying the symposium papers).
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responses might be needed for these varying characteristics among investors. 6 6
C. The Questionable Importance of Biases
Conceding that some biases are genuine cognitive errors with a significant
effect on behavior, the behavioralist school must still address at least three
possible responses to their critique of the financial markets. First, some
behavioral biases may counteract each other. Prentice notes that "people tend to
ignore low probability risks" and this may cause investors to underestimate the
probability of fraud under a market regulatory regime. 67 Setting aside
Prentice's prediction of rampant fraud under such a regime, more troubling is
his omission of the other bias in calculations of probability-the tendency for
people to overestimate the probability of salient risks. For example, people
wildly overestimate the risks of flying because plane crashes are newsworthy.
Car crashes are much more common but far less salient. If recent press
coverage is any indicator, fraud is more like plane crashes than car crashes. If
anything, investors are likely to exaggerate the likelihood of fraud given its
salience. Prentice argues, however, that "[d]ue to the availability heuristic,
investors bombarded with advertisements about the reliability of a brokerage
firm are likely to believe them despite numerous problems with the company's
true actions."'6 8 But the availability heuristic is affected by the salience of the
information presented. Newspaper headlines reporting securities industry
scandals seem much more salient than the industry's commercials. 69 A believer
in the availability heuristic might well predict that investors (upon reading
about Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and so on) would overestimate the risks of
fraud. Predicting which effect will dominate is a hazardous business.70
The second point: Not all investors are dunderheads! While a range of
behavioral biases may exist in the general population, self-selection affects the
level of biases in a particular profession. Richard Posner has observed that
those with an oversized sense of fairness will not choose to enter highly
competitive professions. 7 1  Similarly, those with poor investment
66. For a proposal to shift the focus of securities regulation from issuers to investors
see Stephen J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 279 (2000).
67. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1482.
68. Id. at 1431-32.
69. See Michael Orey & Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Find Jury Pools Polluted by
Antibusiness Biases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at B 1 (reporting that lawyers selecting
jurors find considerable distrust of business ethics in the wake of recent high-profile
scandals).
70. More self-interested policymakers may then abuse the malleability of behavioral
biases, framing their favored regulatory programs in a way to take advantage of the public's
biases.
71. See Posner, supra note 32, at 1570 ("People who are unusually 'fair' will avoid (or,
again, be forced out of) roughhouse activities-including highly competitive businesses, trial
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decisionmaking skills may opt out of the capital markets altogether. This is not
to say that biases are eliminated (especially as new investors arrive daily to the
market), but they may be less significant than in the general population.
Moreover, if behavioral biases vary across investors, perhaps regulations could
be tailored to address the needs of the specific groups of investors while letting
market forces work in other areas. 72 This strategy, however, carries risks; if
investors are unaware of their biases, they may resent being categorized with
the cognitively challenged.
The third point builds on the second. Institutions have emerged to aid
individuals with poor decisionmaking skills. Investors can purchase financial
expertise by investing through an intermediary. Intermediaries may not be
subject to cognitive biases to the same degree as people making decisions for
themselves; detachment may enhance decisionmaking. 73 Mutual funds help
investors choose investments in addition to providing low cost diversification.
Financial planners assist investors in developing an appropriate portfolio of
investments. Brokers also provide investment advice to their clients. The
prevalence of these institutions suggests that overconfidence among investors
may be a relatively isolated phenomenon.
Donald Langevoort points out, however, that institutions themselves (more
precisely, people who work for institutions) may also suffer from behavioral
biases.74 Even institutional investors suffer from loss aversion. Money
managers that fail to meet a perceived benchmark, for example, may take
overly risky positions in an attempt to "catch up. ' '7 5 Money managers may also
lawyering, and the academic rat race.").
72. See Choi, supra note 66 (proposing a system of investor-focused regulation).
73. See James D. Marshall, Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Agents' Evaluations and
the Disparity in Measures of Economic Loss, 7 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 115 (1986) (finding
no endowment effect for subjects placed in the role of advisors); Michael J. Roszkowski &
Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effect of Framing on Measures of Risk Tolerance: Financial Planners
Are Not Immune, 19 J. BEHAV. EcoN. 237, 245 (1990) ("The bad news is that financial
planners are prone to the same framing bias that occurs with the population-at-large .... The
'good' news conveyed by our results is that financial planners seem to be more cautious in
how they handle their client's money than their own money."). But see Russell Korobkin,
The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998) (finding
status quo bias among law students asked to negotiate contracts for hypothetical clients).
74. See Langevoort, Selling Hope, supra note 16, at 641-48. Prentice argues in a
similar vein that institutional investors will be unable to protect themselves because "[a]s
with most other behavioral foibles, the availability heuristic affects professional investors as
well as amateurs, perhaps even more." Prentice, supra note 14, at 1432; see also Hirshleifer,
supra note 1, at 1537 ("It is not obvious that layering agency over folly improves
decisions."). For a useful survey of research findings relating to the use of financial
accounting, see Robert Libby, Robert Bloomfield & Mark W. Nelson, Experimental
Research in Financial Accounting (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford
Law Review), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=261860.
75. See Langevoort, Selling Hope, supra note 16, at 643 ("A string of losses can cause
the agent to assume more risk simply to get back to even, especially if failure to do so might
result in termination and severe reputational penalty.").
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discount small, low probability risks, and act overconfidently. 76 They are also
subject to framing effects: For instance, analysts give more favorable earnings
forecasts to firms that lowball preannouncements of earnings. 77 Anchoring and
overoptimism also seem to be at work: Analysts underreact to unfavorable
information but overreact to favorable information. 78 They also appear to
discount evidence of earnings management. 79 Auditors may provide little check
on earnings management if their biases cause them to favor their clients'
views.80
Worse yet, instead of leading investors away from their behavioral biases,
financial professionals may prey upon investors' behavioral quirks.8 1 Brokers
may realize that cognitive dissonance may cause investors to ratify even
unsound decisions once they are made. 82 Having placed their trust in their
76. See Don A. Moore, Terri R. Kurtzberg, Craig R. Fox & Max H. Bazerman, Positive
Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 ORG. BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95 (1999) (reporting on an experiment involving the portfolio
allocation decisions of 80 business school students and finding that the students consistently
overestimated the future and past performance of their investments).
77. See Hun-Tong Tan, Robert Libby & James E. Hunton, Analysts' Reactions to
Earnings Pre-Announcement Strategies (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Stanford Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=186929 (reporting evidence that firms receive a greater upward
revision of future earnings from analysts when the firms understate positive news).
78. See John C. Easterwood & Stacey R. Nutt, Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings
Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?, 54 J. FIN. 1777 (1999)
(contending that analyst tendencies to underreact to negative information and overreact to
positive information is consistent with systematic optimism in the reaction of analysts to
information). This effect, however, appears to be mitigated by experience. See Michael B.
Mikhail, Beverly R. Walther & Richard H. Willis, The Effect of Experience on Security
Analyst Underreaction, 35 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 101 (2003) (finding that analysts
underreact less to prior earnings information as they gain experience).
79. See Siew Hong Teoh & T.J. Wong, Why New Issues and High Accrual Firms
Underperform: The Role of Analysts' Credulity, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 869 (2001). Of course,
other reasons may explain the failure of analysts to provide accurate investment advice.
Analysts, for example, may purposefully skew their opinions toward management in return
for indirect compensation in the form of high investment banking fees. For a more detailed
discussion of analyst corruption as well as possible solutions, see Stephen Choi & Jill Fisch,
How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal, YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2003).
80. See Max H. Bazerman, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, Why Good
Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. Nov. 2002, at 87, 100 (discussing how
familiarity, discounting, and escalation may bias auditors toward taking a more lenient
approach to a client's accounting irregularities).
81. See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of
Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 581 (1999)
(arguing that permitting contractual waiver of the securities laws "would permit securities-
industry professionals.., to use cognitive distortions to solicit waivers at a time when an
investor is most vulnerable. Rather than encouraging these Faustian bargains, we should be
protecting investors from such predatory conduct").
82. See Langevoort, Selling Hope, supra note 16, at 660 ("The customer.., has ample
means to rationalize short-run poor performance of an individual investment as something
other than the product of bad advice and bad decisions.").
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brokers, investors may give them substantial leeway.8 3 Opportunistic brokers,
may then steer investors toward poor or inappropriate investments. 84 Investors
also may choose poorly among available investments: Flows into mutual funds
tend to follow funds that have enjoyed extraordinary performance. 8 5 While this
strategy has intuitive appeal, that performance does not persist. 86 As Kent
Daniel and his colleagues point out, "The fact that vast amounts of invested
wealth are placed in funds that appear to be wasting resources on active
management does not support the view that investors are good at choosing
funds, nor that funds make good choices on behalf of investors."'87 And the
amount being wasted on active management is not chump change: One
estimate suggests that mutual fund investors spend more than $10 billion per
year on fees for active mutual fund management. 88
Organizational culture within institutions may exacerbate behavioral
problems. Writing more generally about the possibility of cognitive dissonance
in corporate entities, Langevoort poses the question of why managers in a
corporation may lie even when the gain from deception is small, such as when
the corporation is not issuing securities and the managers are not engaged in
insider trading.89 Langevoort argues that group cognitive dissonance may lead
to corporate lying. An entity's culture, for example, may foster overoptimism,
which may lead managers (perhaps unwittingly) to mislead investors about
future profitability.90 Managers may also fall prey to a confirmation bias,
causing them to misrepresent the viability of previously adopted strategies.9 1
83. See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853,
879 (1995) ("Having committed to a particular expert... investors feel a strong tendency to
bolster their choice.") [hereinafter Langevoort, Ego].
84. See Langevoort, Selling Hope, supra note 16, at 661.
85. See Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. FIN.
1589 (1998) (finding that consumers invest disproportionately more in funds which
performed well in the prior period).
86. See Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57
(1997) (finding evidence that persistence in mutual fund performance is not due to
investment skill on the part of fund managers but instead are mostly explained by common
factors in stock returns as well as differences fund expense levels). Cf Mark Grinblatt,
Sheridan Titman & Russ Wermers, Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1088
(1995) (reporting evidence that simple trading rules-such as momentum trading and
herding with other mutual funds-as opposed to superior information at least partially
explains higher mutual fund performance).
87. Daniel et al., supra note 19, at 32.
88. See id. at 43; see also GREGORY BAER & GARY GENSLER, THE GREAT MUTUAL
FUND TRAP (2002) (amassing evidence that actively managed mutual funds overwhelmingly
trail the returns of the overall market while taking on greater amounts of risk).
89. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, Organized Illusions].
90. See id. at 139-40.
91. See id. at 142-43.
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Managers suffering from bounded rationality may ignore danger signals,
causing the firm to withhold important information from the public. 92
Langevoort argues that competition will not necessarily weed out organizations
suffering from group cognitive dissonance because the same overoptimism that
leads to the misrepresentations may also promote morale and productivity. 93
Naive optimism may enhance the bottom line. In addition, biases toward the
status quo and ignoring small danger signs may make it easier to handle vast
information flows. 9 4 The alternative of attempting to process rationally all
available information could lead to organizational paralysis.
Institutions do suffer from behavioral biases. Nevertheless, just as not all
investors are "dunderheads," institutions will not suffer from behavioral biases
equally. If institutions can overcome some biases that plague investors then
institutions can improve the functioning of the capital markets. Moreover,
while some amount of biases may be beneficial for institutions and therefore
resistant to competitive pressures (such as overoptimism), such biases will have
limited impact on investor welfare. Institutional-based biases that have large
negative impacts on investors will impair profitability, making those
institutions vulnerable to competition from other institutions. There is also
evidence that incentives-if sufficiently large-can ameliorate some biases.9 5
For example, pricing anomalies tend to disappear once they have been
identified.96 Even if institutions persist with some low level of biases, the
question remains whether regulation-by inevitably fallible regulators-can
improve investor welfare. If investors act irrationally, will intervention help?
II. BEHAVIORAL BIASES WITHIN THE SEC
For argument's sake, we accept the premise that behavioral problems exist
in the financial markets, that both investors and the institutions that assist them
suffer from these biases, and that they are problematic in their scope and
magnitude. Even accepting these points, however, those who believe strongly
in cognitive biases among investors must explain why similar biases do not also
92. See id. at 147.
93. See id. at 155.
94. See id. at 152.
95. See Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in
Experimental Economics, 31 EcoN. INQUIRY 245 (1993) (reporting results of experimental
studies showing that incentives can improve decisionmaking). But see Dan N. Stone &
David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making, 61 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995) ("[I]t seems plausible that financial
incentives may help prevent decision errors that arise from insufficient attention, but may
exacerbate those that arise from faulty intuition or task misperception. Further, in
contradiction to arguments made by some economists, very high incentives may potentially
decrease (not increase) decision quality by increasing negative affect.") (citations omitted).
96. See Hirshleifer, supra note 1, at 1538-39 (citing "the disappearance of the size
effect" and a lack of persistence for the value effect).
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affect regulators. Behavioralists must account for cognitive biases among
regulators (and the likelihood that such biases are often greater in magnitude
than those facing investors). 97
Applying the insights from behavioral economics, we catalog a series of
biases that SEC officials may face. Organizations may evolve and adapt to
minimize the impact of biases. 98 Nevertheless, just as such biases may persist
within professional institutions, they may cling stubbornly to SEC regulators.
This possibility is heightened by the fact that the SEC does not face
competition, which may whittle down biases within private organizations.
Moreover, biases specific to groups of regulators are also possible in ways that
do not afflict individual investors.
A. Cataloging the Biases at the SEC
It is impossible to compile a comprehensive list of biases that may affect
SEC officials. Indeed, we freely concede that, as with other attempts to apply
behavioral insights to the law, our account is necessarily ad hoc. Nonetheless,
we find evidence of many of the biases identified by the behavioralists in the
SEC's regulatory positions. Other explanations are possible for SEC policy
decisions, including public choice accounts. 99 We believe that a behavioral
analysis can complement and enrich the public choice story. ' 00
1. Bounded search.
Bounded search at the SEC may blind regulators to possible alternatives to
regulation.' 0 ' The SEC is not known for regulatory creativity, often attempting
to tackle difficult problems of corporate governance with measures invariably
97. See Daniel et al., supra note 19, at 53 (arguing that "the case for laissez faire rests
most persuasively not on extreme information efficiency of private markets, but on the
comparative information and resource inefficiency of the political process"); Posner, supra
note 32, at 1575 ("The expert, too, is behavioral man. Behavioral man behaves in
unpredictable ways. Dare we vest responsibility for curing irrationality in the irrational?").
98. See generally Chip Heath, Richard P. Larrick & Joshua Klayman, Cognitive
Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate for Individual Shortcomings, 20
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1 (1998) (compiling different techniques for overcoming the effects of
heuristics and biases).
99. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest
Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 909 (1994).
100. See Jolls et al., supra note 31, at 1543 ("Availability entrepreneurs in the private
sector can heighten the demand for regulation, and public sector availability entrepreneurs
can take advantage of, and heighten, this effect, by advocating anecdote-driven policy. Thus
public choice accounts of legislation can work productively with behavioral accounts; there
is a good deal of synergy between behavioral mechanisms and interest group leaders, many
of whom are amateur (or professional?) behavioral economists.").
101. See Heath et al., supra note 98, at 9-10 (discussing the tendency of individuals to
unduly constrict search for solutions to problems).
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derived from some variant of disclosure. Disclosure traditionally has been
justified as a means of exposing potentially problematic activities. Justice Louis
Brandeis' oft-quoted phrase that "sunlight ... is the best disinfectant" provides
a succinct summary of the philosophy behind disclosure. 102 Once investors
(and others) can see such activities clearly, then market participants are less
likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in the first place. Managers
considering a self-dealing transaction, for example, may choose not to do so
when related-party transactions must be disclosed. 10 3 In addition to ferreting
out agency costs, disclosure may assist rational investors in allocating their
investment dollars, leading to better use of capital and more accurate securities
prices.
For behavioralists, the single-minded focus of the SEC on disclosure
presents a puzzle. We doubt that disclosure is the optimal regulatory strategy if
most investors suffer from cognitive biases. Disclosure may be ineffective in
educating investors who suffer from biases in decisionmaking. 104 Investors
suffering from an overconfidence bias, for example, may ignore the warning
signs from disclosure. Similarly, it is unclear how disclosure can overcome the
cognitive dissonance of people who have made a poor investment choice in the
past. Investors with intractable loss aversion will continue holding a losing
position in hopes of reversing their losses without regard to disclosure. And
what disclosure will help them avoid ratifying their poor investment choices as
"good" decisions? Finally, investment decisions may be driven in substantial
part by the conversations that investors have had most recently. Disclosure may
do little to influence investment decisions based on "tips" or fads. 10 5
The SEC's fixation with disclosure can also be seen in its efforts to protect
investors from fraud in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals. In
response, the SEC proposed requiring corporate chief executive officers to
certify corporate financial statements annually. Congress, anxious to be seen
"doing something," followed this proposal with legislation enacting the CEO
certification requirement into law. 10 6 Investors plagued with overconfidence,
102. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1913).
103. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems,
62 U. CHi. L. REV. 1047 (1995) (contending that mandatory disclosure works to deter
managers from engaging in opportunistic behavior at the expense of shareholders).
104. See Langevoort, Ego, supra note 83, at 880 ("[W]e can readily see why the law's
prized warnings and disclosure will so often have relatively little practical effect, especially
if they are formalized into boilerplate. Investors and consumers want to think the warnings
are meant for someone else, not them.").
105. See Robert J. Shiller & John Pound, Survey Evidence on the Diffusion of Interest
and Information Among Investors, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 46 (1989).
106. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2002) (Corporate
Responsibility For Financial Reports). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also requires a similar
certification from corporate Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). See id. Both the CEO and the
CFO must attest to the "appropriateness of the financial statements and disclosures contained
in the periodic report, and that those financial statements and disclosures fairly present, in all
material respects, the operations and financial condition of the issuer." Id.
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however, may fail to appreciate the risks posed by companies for which the
CEO has failed to provide an unqualified certification. On the other hand,
investors may place too much weight on a salient recent certification, ignoring
(under the influence of the availability heuristic) more distant evidence of
wrongdoing and other risks posed by corporate management. And certification
will not overcome framing effects, including loss aversion by investors. 10 7
Given these behavioral difficulties with disclosure as a regulatory tool, the
SEC's continued reliance on disclosure suggests an unduly narrow search
within the SEC.
Perhaps disclosure's continued allure for the SEC stems from its being a
"compromise" solution, midway between doing nothing and regulating
substantive conduct. 108 In part, the SEC's regulatory strategy reflects the broad
grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate disclosures under the
1933 and 1934 Acts. 109 Alternatives to disclosure generally would require the
SEC to seek statutory authorization from Congress. To get that authority,
however, would almost certainly require the SEC to make an empirical
showing to justify the need for a new regulatory tool. Even though it relies on
disclosure as the cure-all for the maladies of securities markets, the SEC has
done surprisingly little to investigate the impact that disclosure has on those
markets.1 1 0 The agency instead prefers to remain above the grubbiness of
empirical data, preferring to ground its policy prescriptions in "investor
confidence." I1 1 Significantly, the SEC avoids any meaningful definition of
investor confidence, thereby avoiding the possibility of empirical contradiction.
2. Bounded rationality.
The SEC receives vast amounts of information: registration statements
from companies making public offerings, periodic filings for public companies,
107. More troublingly, disclosure may exacerbate some agency costs. In recent
experimental work, Cain et al. found that advisors whose compensation was tied to how high
their clients' estimates were, made even more biased estimates if their conflict was disclosed
to their client-estimator. Worse yet, disclosure did not cause the estimators to discount the
advice provided by their conflicted advisor. See DAYLIAN CAIN, DON MOORE & GEORGE
LOEWENSTEIN, THE DIRT ON COMING CLEAN: THE PERVERSE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS AND
THEIR DISCLOSURE (Carnegie-Mellon Univ., Working Paper 2002).
108. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1504-05 (arguing that "the relative preference
as between two options may be unduly affected by the availability of alternatives,
particularly if they involve compromise possibilities").
109. The SEC's campaign to mandate "one share, one vote" in the 1980s ran afoul of
this limitation. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
110. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 15, at 173 ("[T]he
Commission has never studied investor behavior deeply enough to say-publicly at least-
what percentage of investors read or understand these documents, or what influence the
fundamental analysis-oriented disclosure has on their investment decisions.").
111. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (citing the SEC's uncritical use of
"investor confidence" to support the recently promulgated Regulation FD).
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as well as the myriad filings for secondary market transactions; 112 yet more
information comes from the various securities exchanges on the functioning of
the markets. 113 Through its enforcement work, the SEC also receives almost
daily intelligence on the latest ingenious frauds against investors. When the
SEC engages in rulemaking, it is often deluged with a large number of
comment letters on its proposed rules. 114 Finally, securities lawyers and law
professors provide a steady stream of commentary (like this Article) on topics
ranging from specific regulatory provisions to the overall nature of the
securities regulatory system.
Devising new regulations is costly, requiring analysis of complicated
economic phenomena. Market participants are likely to know far more about
these phenomena than regulators. 115 It is no surprise, therefore, that regulators
often develop tunnel vision, sticking to known regulatory schemes. The SEC's
inability to assess all market risks and prioritize among them (due to the
bounded capabilities of the agency staff and commissioners) may help explain
the SEC's difficulties in grappling with problems in the financial markets.
Agenda setting provides one possible example of bounded rationality
within the SEC. Instead of formulating a cohesive regulatory agenda, the SEC
is generally reactive in its policymaking. Immediately prior to the Enron
scandal, CEO certification of financial statements was nowhere to be found on
the SEC list of policy initiatives. It was hardly news that CEOs sometimes
fudge the numbers, occasionally on a grand scale. 116 Nonetheless, CEO
certification (and other aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) would not have
been adopted without the external pressure to react to a supposed crisis.117
Only rarely does the SEC proactively review its overall regulatory scheme.
112. The SEC makes available many of the SEC filings (under the EDGAR disclosure
system) at its website located at www.sec.gov (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
113. The New York Stock Exchange, for example, provides various data on the NYSE
market at http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/marketinfo.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
114. For example, the Concept Release proposing Regulation FD provoked 6,000
comment letters. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No.
33-7881, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 51716, at 51717 (Aug. 15, 2000).
115. Cf Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1499 (1993)
("[R]egulators may have trouble tapping into the informal information networks accessible
to bankers. The personnel movement that causes information flow is unlikely to occur
between the government and industry because, among other things, the salary differentials
are awesome.").
116. For an example of fraud prior to Enron, one need only look to Sunbeam Inc. and
former CEO "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap who was removed as CEO in 1998 after allegations of
financial fraud. See Kelly Greene, Dunlap Agrees to Settle Suit over Sunbeam, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 15, 2002, at A3.
117. Historical evidence exists that waves of securities regulation typically follow
financial market collapses. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (contending that over the past 300
years the major pieces of securities related regulation came about following a large and
sustained price collapse in the stock market).
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Even then, the agency often fails to follow up the review with substantive
policy initiatives. For several years, the SEC engaged in an ambitious review of
the transaction focus of the Securities Act's regulation of public offerings.' 18 A
comprehensive study in the 1990s under the guidance of then-commissioner
Steven Wallman recommended moving toward a company registration system
of regulation. 119 The rulemaking proposal that followed, however, was a series
of half-measures that were greeted with hostility by the securities industry and
corporate bar. 120 We are still waiting for a comprehensive overhaul of the
public offering process, the basic structure of which dates to the 1930s.
3. Availability, hindsight, and fundamental attribution biases.
Closely related to bounded rationality are the heuristics that regulators use
to manage the deluge of information and problems stemming from the financial
markets. Like investors, regulators suffer from the availability heuristic,
focusing too much attention on recent and immediately available information.
Regulators may also be too quick to see a pattern in a series of events that are
in fact random. 121 A handful of salient accounting scandals may be construed
as a corporate governance crisis. 122 SEC regulators may also suffer from
hindsight, placing too much weight on the probability of past events that
actually occurred (relative to those that did not). Finally, the fundamental
attribution bias may lead SEC investigators to overestimate the influence of
perceived disposition (for example, fraud-prone) in explaining a person's
behavior while overlooking the influence of the person's particular
circumstances in any given situation. 123 Once the SEC has determined someone
118. For a discussion of the transaction focus of the current securities regime, see
Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 567, 604-15 (1997).
119. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE
CAPITAL FORMATION AND REGULATORY PROCESSES REPORT (1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies.shtml.
120. See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act. Release No. 33-7606,
63 SEC Docket 835 (Nov. 3, 1998); Exchange Act Release No. 34-40632, 68 SEC Docket
853 (Nov. 17, 1998).
121. Cf Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone, & Amos Tversky, The Hot Hand in
Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295
(1985) (contending that perceived "hot hand" streaks of success are in fact random).
122. Lucian Bebchuk and Oren Bar-Gill, for example, motivate a theoretical paper on
the incentives of managers and companies to engage in fraud with the observation that the
number of accounting restatements has increased from 49 per year through most of the 1990s
to 156 per year by 2000. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Oren Bar-Gill, Misreporting Corporate
Performance (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review), at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=354141. As a percentage of the number of
total filings made by the over 16,000 public reporting companies, however, the increase is
miniscule.
123. See Justin Kruger & Thomas Gilovich, Naive Cynicism in Everyday Theories of
Responsibility Assessment: On Biased Assumptions of Bias, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
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is not trustworthy, the inclination will be to look for fraud, rather than an
innocent mistake, regardless of the particular situation. And rarely will the SEC
receive the feedback of having to test its theories in court. Most enforcement
actions will be settled because defendants will not want to risk the potentially
ruinous collateral estoppel effect of having a fraud judgment entered against
them. 124
Each of these biases is exacerbated by the political imperative to respond to
the latest headlines. Analyst independence only became a priority when the
New York state attorney general revealed incriminating internal emails from
Merrill Lynch.12 5 Only after Enron and WorldCom moved accounting from the
business page to the front page was auditor independence a compelling need.
The SEC (and many others) readily assumed that the small number of
companies implicated in these scandals reflected a broader pattern, a
statistically very dubious proposition (following the "law" of small
numbers). 12 6 Notwithstanding this dubious empirical foundation, once this
story took hold alternative explanations were pushed aside. 127 Just as curious as
the (over)-reaction to the Enron scandal was the lack of reform effort prior to
the scandal. The Enron scandal provided no new information. The SEC and
indeed most investors have long known that analyst ratings are skewed toward
optimism and that auditors often provide nonauditing services to their
clients. 128
Of course, one could argue that the SEC's preoccupation with scandals
stems from political pressure that also reflects the availability heuristic. The
fact that Congress itself may act under the availability heuristic, however, is
PSYCHOL. 743 (1999); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1504; see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Monitoring: The Behavior Economics of Inducing Agents' Compliance with Legal Rules,
2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 71, 89 ("My suspicion, however, is that concealed compliance
wrongdoing by agents is only occasionally the product of inherently bad moral dispositions.
More often, a morally normal person gets caught in a situation that leads gradually to
increasingly bad choices. Here, we revisit the fundamental attribution bias: the idea that
observers underestimate in others the influence of situational factors, and overestimate
character.").
124. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 559 ("Experience accompanied by
feedback allows experts to identify situations in which they are using inappropriate heuristics
or are trapped by misleading schema.").
125. See Cheryl Winokur Munk, Merrill Changes Stock-Research Rating Process,
WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at C16.
126. See supra note 25 (discussing the tendency of people to put too much weight on
small samples).
127. See Clifford R. Mynatt, Michael E. Doherty & William Dragan, Information
Relevance, Working Memory, and the Consideration ofAlternative, 46A Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 759 (1993) (finding that subjects who had developed a plausible hypothesis were
less able to recognize alternatives).
128. See Steven D. Jones, Heard in the Northwest: Region 's Rare 'Sell' Ratings Apply
to Burgers, Machinery anda Thrift, WALL ST. J. NW, at 2, 1999 WL-WSJ 24923975 (noting
that "of 833 opinions in place on the 135 stocks last week [of companies located in the
Northwest United States], there was a 'strong sell' on only one").
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hardly cause for comfort. Combining availability with the political imperative
to "do something" creates a high likelihood of regulatory overreaction. 129 Such
a bias within Congress, combined with biases at the SEC, further reduces the
likelihood that the regulatory scheme will protect investors in a cost-effective
fashion.
4. Framing effects.
How a particular question is framed may determine whether and how SEC
officials respond. Framing effects may lead the SEC to fight vigorously to
avoid a possible loss (in terms of investor welfare or the SEC's own authority).
On the other hand, the SEC may be less interested in advancing investor
welfare beyond the present status quo.' 30
The indifference of the SEC to various areas of securities regulation absent
a large loss to investors suggests not only bounded rationality (and the related
availability heuristic and hindsight bias) but also the importance of loss
aversion. Many regulatory initiatives by the SEC have been launched shortly
after either a large loss to investors or the threat of diminished authority for the
SEC. 13 1 The SEC and Congress have been galvanized to action recently with
the collapse of stock prices in the technology and telecom sectors and the
allegations of accounting malfeasance that followed. 132 The threatened loss of
issuers and investors to overseas markets spurred the passage of Regulation S
and Rule 144A in 1990.133 On the other hand, absent a threat to the SEC's
authority or to investors, the SEC has typically remained complacent.
One could argue that this regulatory approach makes sense-put out fires
and "don't fix what ain't broken." The impact on regulations is uncertain.
Moreover, it may be costly to experiment with new regulations without the
129. For evidence that the urge to "do something" is highest immediately following a
drop in the financial markets, see Banner, supra note 117, at 850.
130. See Steven M.H. Wallman, Competition, Innovation, and Regulation in the
Securities Markets, 53 Bus. LAW. 341, 346 (1998) ("Frequently, criticism is leveled at
regulators' concrete failure to protect someone who is hurt, rather than for precluding
something new or experimental that might-although no one is sure-have led to a better
world.").
131. See Banner, supra note 117, at 850.
132. See Charles Gasparino & Tom Hamburger, Congress Broadens Probe of Enron
Fall To Wall Street Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at C1 (reporting Congressional
investigation into "analysts who continued to recommend Enron's stock last fall as the
company careened toward bankruptcy").
133. See Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6862 [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,637, at 80,639 (Apr. 23, 1990); see also Josh
Futterman, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor
Protection While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 806,
840-41 (1995) ("Prior to the adoption of Regulation S, some members of the U.S. investment
industry maintained that, due to U.S. restrictions on offshore securities offerings, U.S.
issuers were at a disadvantage to their overseas counterparts in the offshore markets.").
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threat of a perceived and immediate loss to investors. But this generalization
cannot always be true. Sometimes rationalizing regulation, such as the proposal
for company registration, 134 may benefit both issuers and investors. The
continued bias toward reactive reform to the securities laws may represent at
least partially a framing-effects-related bias toward the status quo.135
5. Overconfidence.
SEC regulators may be overconfident in their policy prescriptions, leading
to errors and regulatory overreaching. Indeed, the specialized expertise claimed
by the SEC may inflate the confidence with which regulators make decisions.
Experts tend to be overly optimistic in assessing their own decisionmaking
ability. 136 As Dale Griffin and Amos Tversky put it, experts are "often wrong
but rarely in doubt."' 13 7
Examples of SEC overconfidence in its ability to regulate the securities
markets come readily to mind. The SEC's ambitious plan to integrate the stock
exchanges and the over-the-counter market into a unified national market
system is widely regarded as a failure, some twenty-five years after the
proposal was first adopted.' 38 Likewise, the SEC consistently has argued that
U.S. style securities regulation is superior to other regulatory regimes around
the world, a position more awkward to sustain after Enron and WorldCom. The
SEC, for instance, has insisted on the superiority of GAAP over intemational
accounting standards, despite a dearth of empirical evidence to support the
assertion. 139
Insider trading provides another conspicuous example of SEC
overconfidence in regulation. Bolstered by the strong performance of the U.S.
capital markets in the 1980s and 1990s, the SEC aggressively exported U.S.
style insider trading prohibitions across the world. In large part due to the
SEC's efforts, many countries adopted formal prohibitions against insider
trading in the 1980s and 1990s. 140 The SEC hoped that insider trading
134. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
135. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 605 ("If those affected by a regulatory
program 'endow' the status quo, the status will likely remain in place.").
136. See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 28, at 411, 427, 430.
137. Id. at 412.
138. See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315 (contending that special interest group
influences on the SEC make the success of the national market system unlikely).
139. See Christian Leuz, ]AS Versus US GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based
Evidence from Germany's New Market, 41 J. ACCT. REs. 445 (2003) (finding no differences
between firms following lAS and those following GAAP for a series of measures of
information asymmetry).
140. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in the
International Response to Insider Trading, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 199,
204-06.
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prohibitions would become accepted (and enforced) in other countries as they
are in the United States. Despite the presence of formal insider trading bans,
few countries have ever enforced their insider trading prohibitions. 14 1 At the
end of 1998, 87 countries with stock exchanges prohibited insider trading, but
only 38 countries had enforced their prohibitions even once. 142 In our view,
this campaign by the SEC reflects undue optimism in the power of the law to
change behavior.
The SEC's regulatory turf battles with the CFTC may also stem from
overconfidence. The United States allocates regulatory responsibility for
"securities" 143 to the SEC and responsibility for regulating "commodities" and
"futures" to the Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 144
The SEC and CFTC have squabbled over their respective authorities where the
jurisdictional lines are unclear. These turf battles have occurred not only
between the regulatory agencies, but also within Congress, with the Commerce
Committee siding with the SEC and the Agricultural Committee siding with the
CFTC. This competition between the agencies generally has produced
substantial lobbying costs and distraction without any evidence of improvement
for investors. 14 5 Although a straightforward public choice explanation rooted in
regulators' desires to amass their own power explains this turf battle quite well,
a pervasive overconfidence in the SEC's own regulatory abilities compared
with the CFTC's (and vice versa) may have exacerbated the ongoing rift. 146
141. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57
J. FtN. 75, 80-84, 88-90 (2002) (reporting that prior to 1990 only 9 of 34 countries with
prohibitions on insider trading have ever enforced their prohibitions).
142. See id.
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994) (providing a definition of "security" for the
Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994) (providing a definition of "security"
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
144. A futures contract is a standardized agreement under which a buyer agrees to
purchase a specific quantity of a particular commodity at a specified date in the future at a
fixed price.
145. Indeed, SEC officials during the 1970s feared that the definition of the term
"commodity" could even encompass ordinary securities. Former SEC Chairman Roderick
Hills noted in 1975 that "it is relatively easy to suggest that the most basic examples of what
is unambiguously a security, such as a share of GM or AT&T, are literally within the
definition of a 'commodity' ...." Letter from SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills to CFTC
Chairman William T. Bagley [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
20,117 (Nov. 13, 1975). The SEC's battle with the CFTC culminated in the Shad-Johnson
Accord of 1982. See Sanford A. Fine, Back to the (Single Stock) Future: The New
Regulatory Framework Governing Single-Stock Futures Trading, 54 ADMN. L. REv. 513,
520-22 (2002).
146. See Arlen, supra note 20, at 1776 ("This self-serving tendency may even grow
stronger when groups predictably attempt to maximize the difference between themselves
and another group.") (emphasis added).
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6. Confirmation bias.
Regulators at the SEC may suffer from a confirmation bias. 147 Once
regulations are on the books, regulators may feel the need to justify their worth
instead of critically evaluating their effects. Evidence that does not discredit
regulation unambiguously will be ignored. 148 And the confirmation bias will be
more pronounced if the evidence is more complex and subject to conflicting
inferences, a fair characterization of most regulatory problems in the securities
markets. 14 9 Self-justification is exacerbated when decisionmakers are held
147. See Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, 32 PSYCHOL. LEARNING &
MOTIVATION 385 (1995) (describing different ways in which the confirmation bias can affect
decisions). If the behavioral economists are right about the pervasiveness of cognitive biases,
perhaps we should not be surprised that the writing of even behavioral economists is infected
by the biases. See Mitchell, supra note 33, at 73 n.9 ("The behavioral law and economics
scholars exhibit a pessimism bias in their work: they tend to ignore or discount research
findings contrary to their view of legal decision-makers as afflicted by numerous judgmental
biases and decision-making errors, while simultaneously interpreting ambiguous research
findings as supportive of their pessimistic view of human rationality.") (internal quotations
omitted). For example, Robert Prentice reports the existence of a confirmation bias, which
causes "trained scientists [to] judge research reports that agree with their views to be of
higher quality than those that disagree." Robert A. Prentice, The Case of The Irrational
Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 146
(2000) (citing Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of
Evidence Quality, 56 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993)). Prentice
then goes on to downplay the significance of studies finding that auditors paid more attention
to disconfirming than confirming evidence, praising a study that supports his thesis of a
confirmation bias.
One might defer more to Prentice's interpretation of the empirical evidence if errors of
statistical inference were not so prevalent in his work. For example, Prentice identifies a
"rising tide of insider trading lawsuits involving accountant defendants." Id. at 189. The
basis for this claim, however, is a string cite of seventeen SEC enforcement actions over a
period of twenty-five years. Id. at 189 n.314. This is obviously too small a sample from
which to draw any meaningful inferences. More fundamentally, one cannot infer anything
about a change of the behavior of accountants over time because of "the rising tide of insider
trading lawsuits" generally over that time. The SEC will almost certainly find more insider
trading by accountants if it devotes more resources to prosecuting insider trading, as it did
during this period even if accountants are not engaging in more insider trading. Changes in
the number of suits against accountants tells us nothing about the behavior of accountants if
we do not control for the amount of insider trading enforcement resources generally.
Similarly, Prentice claims that accounting fraud violations "tend not to be niggling," based
on a study of SEC enforcement actions. See id. at 201 n.390 (citing Ehsan H. Feroz,
Kyungjoo Park & Victor S. Pastena, The Financial and Market Effects of the SEC's
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 107, 114 (Supp. 1991)).
SEC enforcement actions cannot tell us anything about the average magnitude of accounting
violations because the size of a violation is a factor that the SEC relies upon in deciding
which cases to prosecute.
148. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 89, at 137 ("Ambiguous
information tends to be dismissed as unmanageable.").
149. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 648 n.60 (1999) (collecting
studies).
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accountable in public settings. o50 Such self-justification can obstruct any
change in the status quo.
The SEC in particular is prone to the self-justification bias because the
SEC can always point to the depth and liquidity of the U.S. securities markets
to justify its regulatory efforts. It is difficult to argue with success. But this self-
congratulation ignores the status of the U.S. securities markets as the deepest
and most liquid in the world before the SEC was created. 15' In fact, the
liquidity of the U.S. markets gives SEC regulators large leeway to make
mistakes and reduce overall investor value before investors would depart for
other markets. 152 SEC regulators that focus on the success of the U.S. securities
markets therefore may become "locked in," making future changes to
regulations difficult. 153
150. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 89, at 142 ("[O]nce executives
have committed to a course of action, their subsequent survey of information is strongly
biased to bolster their choice-especially when their choice is public, and they can be held
accountable for their decisions.").
151. U.S. markets were more liquid than their European counterparts before the
securities laws were adopted in the United States and the adoption of those laws had no
apparent effect on liquidity. Prentice incorrectly claims that the regulation by the SEC "led
directly to a large increase in investor participation in the stock markets." Prentice, supra
note 14, at1420 (citing JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 561-62
(rev. ed. 1995)). In fact, the Exchange Act was a resounding failure at restoring investor
confidence-the volume of trading remained below 1929 levels for another three decades.
See ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935-1975 303
(1975) (finding that the average daily trading volume in 1955 was 1.7 million shares below
1929 averages). Further, the passage of the Exchange Act-with its strong antimanipulation
provisions-resulted in significant declines in NYSE and AMEX seat values. See G.
William Schwert, Public Regulation of National Securities Exchanges: A Test of the Capture
Hypothesis, 8 BELL J. ECON. 128, 134 (1977) (providing evidence that the average seat price
on the NYSE and AMEX fell 50% during the month when Congress first considered the
Securities and Exchange Act). Reduction in seat values is not the result one would have
expected from government regulation intended to "restore investor confidence," i.e.,
willingness to trade over the exchanges. Part of this decline in seat values may be
attributable to the SEC's open hostility at the time to the goal of liquidity. See RALPH F. DE
BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 158 (1964) (discussing criticisms of
liquidity by former SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas and in staff reports). In this regard, it
is worth noting that institutional investors-who should have been a primary beneficiary of
regulation-were critical of the Exchange Act. See C. John Kuhn, The Securities Act and Its
Effect upon the Institutional Investor, 4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 80, 85 (1937) ("[l]t is the
consensus of opinion among trained security buyers that regulations [under the Exchange
Act] ... have a restrictive effect upon markets outweighing the benefits gained.").
152. To put it another way, the liquidity of the U.S. securities markets is tied together
with the U.S. securities regulatory regime. One of us has recommended undoing this tie to
increase competitive pressure on securities regulators. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note
10, at 918.
153. A similar problem may afflict the SEC's supporters. Prentice spends a substantial
portion of his article documenting the existence of fraud in the securities markets (see
Prentice, supra note 14, at 1415-26) "even with seventy years of regulation on the books."
Id. at 1458 n.286. The continuing existence of fraud is a startling revelation, but it is not at
all clear how the prevalence of securities fraud under the SEC's watch counsels in favor of
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The SEC is also reluctant to concede weaknesses in its policy positions.
For many years, the SEC prohibited forward-looking ("soft") information
disclosures in SEC filings. 154 This position persisted despite evidence that
investors, when making an investment decision, often care most about the
future prospects of a company and their implications for future cash flows to
investors. 155 Although the SEC finally adopted a limited safe harbor for
forward-looking disclosures in 1979,156 its reach is narrow and the agency
continues to limit such disclosures, in some cases prohibiting forward-looking
disclosures under its gun-jumping rules for companies planning a public
offering. 157 When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, which contained a statutory forward-looking information safe
harbor, the SEC pushed for a long list of transactions that would be excluded
from the safe harbor. 158 And it has yet to exercise the exemptive authority
provided by Congress in that law to expand the safe harbors.
The confirmation bias (and the SEC's overconfidence in its prior policies)
can be seen in the path dependence in the SEC's regulations. As originally
enacted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the securities laws provided separate
disclosure standards for companies making public offerings and those whose
securities simply trade on the secondary markets. For several decades
thereafter, commentators recognized the need to unify disclosure standards.1
59
Disclosures have the same relevance to investors whether they are purchasing
in a public offering or on the secondary market. The SEC did not seriously
consider revamping the scheme until the 1960s, ultimately adopting the present
integrated disclosure system. 160 Even that, however, falls short of a full-fledged
retaining the SEC rather than considering a market alternative.
154. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 777-87 (1995); see also Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,211 (Feb. 2, 1973).
155. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1976, at 32, 35-37.
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1997), originally promulgated in Safe Harbor Rule for
Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6084 (June 25, 1979), available in 1979 WL
16388; 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997).
157. See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, SEC Release No. 5180, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) 3056 (Aug. 16, 1971)
(warning that "care should be exercised so that, for example, predictions, projections,
forecasts, estimates and opinions concerning value are not given with respect to such things,
among others, as sales and earnings and value of the issuers' securities").
158. See, e.g., Noelle Matteson, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Do
Issuers Still Get Soaked in the Safe Harbor?, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 527, 548 n.139
(1997).
159. The seminal article making the case for integrated securities disclosure is Milton
H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities " Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
160. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
47 Fed Reg 11,380 (Mar 16, 1982).
[Vol. 56:1
October 2003] BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE SEC
scheme of company disclosure. 16 1
The SEC also tends to believe that investors view the world the same way
that it does. The false consensus effect is the "widespread and stubborn
illusion.., that others share one's own attitudes and behaviors to a greater
extent than they really do."'16 2 Closely related, the SEC may engage in self-
serving inferences, choosing to view investors in the light most supportive of
the need and importance of the SEC. 16 3 The SEC's insistence that investor
attitudes mirror views among SEC commissioners and staff may lead the
agency toward ill-advised regulations. The SEC often uncritically states that it
seeks to protect investors-and in particular, that absent the SEC's efforts,
investor confidence in the market will deteriorate. Rarely, however, does the
SEC verify that its assumptions are correct. The SEC instead simply asserts that
investor confidence demands its latest regulatory intervention. The recently
promulgated Regulation FD, prohibiting selective disclosures from companies,
is just such an example. 164 The SEC argued (with no empirical basis) that the
practice of selective disclosure to analysts was undermining investor
confidence. 165 A new regulatory burden was imposed on issuers with little or
no evidence that it would produce countervailing benefits for investors. 166
7. Groupthink.
Cognitive biases within the SEC are magnified by pervasive organizational
"groupthink." Groupthink occurs when individuals come to identify with the
organization and accept its mission uncritically due to their perceived
membership in the group. 16 7 Once a commitment has been made, group
161. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
162. Langevoort, Ego, supra note 83, at 859 (citing Gary Marks & Norman Miller, Ten
Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical Review,
102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72 (1987)).
163. Donald Langevoort describes self-serving inferences as follows:
Self-serving inferences arise when there is a reasonably high level of ambiguity surrounding
a situation. With that kind of cognitive freedom, the mind tends to form stronger-than-
justifiable inferences in the direction of a person's self-interest. More simply, people see as
correct what is more properly described as convenient. Having rationalized their inferences,
people feel little guilt in acting upon them.
Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest In Their Corporate Clients'
Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574 (2002).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2000) (Regulation FD).
165. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881,
65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 15, 2000) ("We believe that the practice of selective
disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.").
166. On a related note, Donald Langevoort has argued that the case for Regulation FD
is at best uncertain from the viewpoint of behavioral economics. See Langevoort, Taming the
Animal Spirits, supra note 15, at 165-75.
167. See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK (1972); see also James D. Cox &
Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 83, 99-
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members will downplay feedback that is inconsistent with that position in order
to minimize tensions within the group. 168 Although an individual may assess a
particular decision critically, members of a group defer to the consensus.
Groupthink will also tend to reduce the range of hypotheses that an
organization considers when faced with a problem.169
The SEC is known for its strong organizational culture. Often praised as
hard-working and dedicated, the mission of "investor protection" is taken to
heart by virtually all SEC staffers. 170 This tendency is no doubt reinforced by
self-selection among those seeking SEC employment. 17 1 The type of people
who choose to become regulators and enforcement officials may have a
heightened sense of justice and fairness. Such traits may lead regulators to
work hard for relatively low pay. Such a culture helps maintain morale and
focuses SEC staffers on the task of regulating the capital markets.
Despite these benefits, the strong investor protection culture within the
SEC may also lead to groupthink. Homogeneous groups like the self-selected
SEC staffers are particularly susceptible to the confirmation bias 172 and are
perhaps more likely to engage in self-serving inferences (to the extent that all
the staffers have a homogeneous interest). 173 Once the SEC has committed to a
policy initiative through a rulemaking proposal-thereby tentatively
committing to the "group"-feedback on the proposal may get less weight than
it would have if the information had been solicited before the SEC fixated upon
a specific proposal.
Groupthink may also manifest itself in the SEC's single-minded focus on
108 (applying analysis to decisions by corporate boards); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions
by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37-49
(1981) (same).
168. See Langevoort, Ego, supra note 83, at 874.
169. See Heath et al., supra note 98, at 20 ("Often, organizations ensure that
individuals weigh information effectively by forcing them to interact with others who might
weigh the information differently.").
170. In a speech delivered while he was Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt,
summarized the SEC's mission:
Investor protection is our legal mandate.
Investor protection is our moral responsibility.
Investor protection is my top personal priority.
Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider
Trading, 12(4) INSIGHTS 17, 18 (1998). Pritchard, a former senior counsel at the SEC, can
attest from personal experience that this attitude is widely shared among the staff.
171. Cf Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 579-80 ("Those who seek work at an
agency charged with responsibility for the environment probably have strong views about
the appropriate goals and means of environmental regulation. Consequently, agencies can
become myopically focused on their missions.").
172. See Stefan Schulz-Hardt, Dieter Frey, Carsten Ldthgens & Serge Moscovici,
Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
655 (2000) (describing tendency for like-minded individuals to exacerbate the confirmation
bias).
173. See supra note 163 (describing self-serving inferences).
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investor protection. When a decision can be placed on a normative scale, such
as more or less investor protection, group decision dynamics will push the
group toward a polar end of the scale.174 At the SEC, the systematic tendency
will be to settle on outcomes that promise more investor protection. Many
investors may be able to protect themselves, but the SEC usually focuses on the
stereotypical "widows and orphans" in crafting protections.
Perhaps due to groupthink, overconfidence, the confirmation bias, self-
serving inferences, loss aversion, or some combination of these biases, the SEC
assumes that it knows what investors consider "fair" in the capital markets. 17 5
To take one example, the SEC has for years contended that insider trading is
"unfair" and that, if not prohibited, the practice will cause investors to lose
confidence in the markets. 176 But why is it unfair if investors discount for the
risk of insider trading and thereby pay a lower price for their securities?
Perhaps an independent and unchangeable norm exists that insider trading is
unfair. Or perhaps investors lack the ability to fully discount for the risk of
insider trading and failing to prohibit such activities will dry up market
liquidity. This possibility seems unlikely, however, given the commonly
acknowledged prevalence of insider trading before the SEC became serious
about enforcement in the 1980s. Market liquidity coexisted peacefully with
notorious insider trading, as it continues to do in many countries. 17 7 Our task
here is not to defend insider trading. 178 We only point out that the SEC has
accepted uncritically the premise of unfairness without investigation and has
174. See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review
of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 535 (2002 ("When the outcome of a
decision can be placed on a normative scale, such as being risky rather than safe, liberal
rather than conservative, or certain rather than uncertain, then the dynamics of group
decisionmaking can actually increase the tendency of the group to choose an outcome that is
on one end of the scale rather than in the middle."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative
Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (canvassing evidence on
group polarization).
175. See Jeffrey M. Laderman, William B. Glaberson, Gene G. Marcial, Peter Philipps
& John N. Frank, The Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 78 (quoting
former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt as stating, "If the investor thinks he's not getting a fair
shake, he's not going to invest, and that is going to hurt capital investment in the long run.").
176. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (No. 96-842). Full disclosure: Pritchard, then a lawyer at the SEC, helped write this
brief. For a criticism of the confidence-in-the-market argument, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Law Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1241-45 (1995).
177. See Bhattacharya & Daouk, supra note 141 (providing evidence that enforcement
of insider trading laws is relatively infrequent outside the United States).
178. For such a defense, see HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK
MARKET (1966). For criticisms, see, for example, Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider
Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051,
1051-64 (1982); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (arguing that insiders may structure a
corporation's transactions to profit from insider trading); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading:
Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STuD. 801, 810-11 (1980).
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ignored evidence that insider trading does not impair investor confidence.
B. Corrective Mechanisms
Corrective measures may help to overcome the behavioral biases of
regulators. If you explain framing effects to a person and then immediately ask
how they value avoiding the loss of a coffee mug compared with gaining a
coffee mug, the person is less prone to framing. 179 This example shows that
structural mechanisms can reduce behavioral biases. For our purposes, the
relevant questions are: Which mechanisms would work for the SEC and are
these mechanisms cost-justified? We review below possible antidotes to
cognitive biases within the SEC.
1. Internal organization.
Organizations can structure themselves to reduce the impact of behavioral
biases. Absent intervention, "experts may myopically focus on issues within
their area of expertise and thereby fail to recognize that a decision would
benefit from accessing other bodies of knowledge or ways of thinking."'
180
Organizations can call on multiple decisionmakers with different types of
expertise to reduce the risk that heuristics will be applied without consideration
of context. 18 1 The staff of the SEC is organized into multiple divisions, and
most regulatory proposals will be reviewed by more than one division. At a
minimum, the general counsel's office will comment on any proposal before
the commissioners approve it. This structure requires the division proposing a
regulatory initiative to defend its assumptions and may allow for creative
alternatives. 182
The process by which commissioners approve staff proposals suggests
another means by which organizations can reduce cognitive bias: hierarchical
review. Forcing decisionmakers to justify their decision may reduce some
cognitive problems, as with judicial and political oversight. In the SEC, this
takes the form of the commissioners reviewing the proposals that typically
originate with the agency staff. In this way, the expert commissioners scrutinize
the work of the experts on the staff. And the mandate of political balance
among the commissioners provides some assurance that proposals will be
subjected to diverse viewpoints. 183 Of course, the efficacy of this review will
179. See Arlen et al., supra note 29 (providing evidence on the importance of context
in determining the magnitude of framing effects).
180. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 560.
181. See Heath et al., supra note 98.
182. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 561 (arguing that placing experts into
separate groups helps avoid "escalating commitment" to a proposal).
183. The Exchange Act provides for five commissioners at the head of the SEC. No
more than three of the five commissioners may be from the same political party. See 15
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be undermined if political considerations or cronyism, rather than merit and
intellectual diversity, drive the selection of commissioners.
Despite the promise of organizational structure, the effects of behavioral
biases are unlikely to be eliminated completely. Although organizational
structure may reduce some biases, it may introduce countervailing biases.
Assigning different tasks to different divisions may help increase diversity of
perspectives, but contribution to a group product may reduce individuals'
incentives to engage fully in making the decision. 184 Individual effort will be
further reduced if the decisionmaker only has authority to make
recommendations, rather than making the ultimate decision. 185 So, although
review by SEC commissioners may bring accountability to the SEC staff, it
comes at the cost of reducing the engagement of the staff in the initial decision.
Moreover, the thoroughness of review by the commissioners will be limited by
the fact that each commissioner has only one vote and that vote will rarely be
decisive. The power of any individual commissioner will be further diluted by
the practice of the SEC staff of not vetting proposals with commissioners until
the time for final approval. At that point, scrutiny from the commissioners may
have little impact. 186
The lack of a unified theory of behavioral biases makes it unclear what
effect organizational structure will have on the magnitude of the biases. 187
Does introducing experts from different fields appreciably reduce the
tendencies of specific experts to act with overconfidence and to misapply
heuristics learned in one field more generally to other fields? We simply do not
know the answers to these questions.
2. Judicial review.
Behavioral decision theory commentators have argued that judicial review
can ameliorate the behavioral biases of regulators. This makes intuitive sense;
not surprisingly, as Jeffrey Rachlinski writes, "cognitive biases are easier to
spot in others than in oneself."188 Mark Seidenfeld contends that review-even
U.S.C. § 78(d) (2003).
184. See Seidenfeld, supra note 174, at 510-11.
185. See id. at 511.
186. In addition, to the extent the commissioners and the SEC's staff share a common
preference (for example, the expansion of the SEC's authority), the self-serving inferences of
commissioners will become magnified when commissioners are called upon to endorse
equally self-serving judgments made by the staff. See Kristina A. Diekmann, Steven M.
Samuels, Lee Ross & Max H. Bazerman, Self-Interest and Fairness in Problems of Resource
Allocation: Allocators Versus Recipients, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1061 (1997).
187. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of any unified
theory explaining behavioral biases).
188. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 65-66 (2000).
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by a nonexpert judiciary-may reduce the biases of expert regulators. 189
Regulators who anticipate review by an unknown audience will tend to take
greater care in arriving at their decisions. In creating a written record,
regulators will look at more diverse information sets if a written record is
required. 190 This may mitigate the biasing effects of the availability heuristic.
Being forced to consider alternatives and counterarguments is a useful antidote
to overconfidence. 19 1 Biases related to the conviction of regulators in their
positions (for example, overconfidence and overoptimism biases) can be
reduced if regulators are forced to list the weaknesses in their position. 192 The
potential for review will also discourage regulators from relying on heuristics
because they must justify their decisions in writing to nonexperts.
Judicial review, however, will not eliminate regulatory biases and it may
introduce others. Regulators subject to review may take advantage of their
expertise and information advantages over the court and downplay their
positions' weaknesses. The subject matter under review may be sufficiently
complex that judges simply cannot determine the exact nature of the reasoning.
If a lack of judicial expertise is a serious problem, judicial oversight may have
little effect on regulators' decisions, thus doing little to overcome cognitive
biases among regulators. Judicial review is also likely to exacerbate regulators'
confirmation bias (resulting in a "circle the wagons" effect as regulators defend
their past regulatory positions). 193 Judges, moreover, may face their own
behavioral biases. 194
3. Political oversight
The SEC is not the only regulator of the securities markets. Congress and
the President have considerable influence over the capital markets both
directly, through legislation and the nomination processes, and indirectly,
through budgetary and other pressure on the SEC. While the SEC has sought to
expand its authority, Congress has worked, on occasion, to reduce the
regulatory burdens of regulation. For example, the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act reduced the cost to issuers of defending securities fraud
class actions. 195
Political oversight, however, is no panacea for behavioral biases among
regulators. Politicians themselves may face their own behavioral biases, and
189. See Seidenfeld, supra note 174, at 508-26.
190. See id. at 516 ("Individuals who are accountable to an audience with unknown
views are significantly more self-critical while making their decisions.").
191. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 588.
192. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Creating
Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 913, 920 (1997).
193. See Seidenfeld, supra note 174, at 524.
194. For a discussion of judicial biases, see infra Part III.A.2.
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1), (2) (2003).
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there is no reason to think that the politicians' biases are any less than those
facing regulators.196 Before the Enron scandal broke, Capitol Hill was silent on
the roles that auditors and analysts play as gatekeepers in the securities
markets. After the scandal, politicians were baying for regulatory reform. This
shift on the part of lawmakers could represent a rational response to new
information, but we doubt it. More likely, it is a symptom of the availability
heuristic at work. 197 Indeed, opportunistic politicians may take advantage of
the biases of the electorate, playing up recent instances of fraud to gain
electoral support.
Scandal driven reform followed by political neglect has been a recurring
pattern in the securities markets. Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act in the
Great Depression in response to scandals in the banking industry. While
scandals may be needed to focus dispersed lawmakers' collective will, they
often result in overreaction, 198 particularly if political entrepreneurs succeed in
framing the issue in a way that resonates with the electorate. 199 "Fraud led to
the market crash that wiped out your savings!" is easier to sell to voters who
weigh losses more heavily than gains than "[e]xcessive regulations will reduce
your investment gains by one-half of one percent per year!" Once in place,
legislation often takes on a life of its own. It took Congress over six decades to
get around to repealing the Glass-Steagall Act.200 Legislators may accept the
wisdom of prior legislation uncritically, operating under a confirmation bias.
And industry participants may be quiescent if regulation serves as a barrier to
entry.2 0 1 Without any recent information of equal salience (nonscandals tend
196. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 572:
Members [of Congress] seem vulnerable to the cognitive illusions that typically go
unrecognized and unremediated by lay decisionmakers: being more attuned to potential harm
than to foregone benefits (framing effects); overestimating the prevalence of events that are
easy to remember (the availability heuristic); and disregarding the prevalence of an event
altogether in evaluating its importance (the representativeness heuristic).
197. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology
for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 762 (1990) ("[l]mmediately following a widely
publicized disaster, citizens will place unusually great demands on their government to take
action against recurrence, but as attention subsides, so too will the demand for action.").
198. See Banner, supra note 117, at 850 (contending that over the past 300 years most
of the major pieces of securities related regulation came about following a large and
sustained price collapse in the stock market).
199. See Noll & Krier, supra note 197, at 769 ("[A]deptness at characterizing issues
can go a long way in determining the policy preferences expressed by the electorate.").
200. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
201. Roger Noll and Jim Krier argue that this will often be a conscious political
strategy:
[T]he best political strategy might be to enact rather rigorous and explicitly specified policy
targets but set up a process of implementation that provides distributive benefits to
participants in the process. An example would be a cumbersome process for setting industry
standards, combined with differentially more rigorous standards for new sources of risk than
for old ones-so that the costs to industry of the tough standards will be offset (perhaps more
than offset) by barriers to competitive entry.
Noll & Krier, supra note 197, at 774-75. The 1933 Act provides an obvious example of this
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not to generate newspaper headlines) no impetus will exist to remove the
protective legislation.202
Congressional review will also lead the SEC to skew deliberation to make
rules easier to justify to committee chairs and their staffs. If rules are proposed
to satisfy political demands, legislative oversight will induce greater
justification for those rules, but it is unlikely to generate more thoughtful
consideration on the part of regulators. 20 3 Because the SEC staff will be aware
of the preferences of important members of congressional committees, the staff
will tailor regulatory rules to conform to those preferences. 20 4 To the extent
congressional committees suffer from their own biases or are motivated out of
public choice concerns, the SEC's incentive to tailor rules toward the interests
of such committees may not improve investor welfare.
C. Other Explanations for Regulatory Failure at the SEC
Other theories may explain the SEC's policy decisions, such as public
choice explanations that rely on the rational actor model.20 5 SEC regulators
may push new regulations not because they are caught in heuristic traps but
because more regulation equates with an increased role for the SEC. Likewise,
SEC regulators may fight the CFTC for jurisdiction and otherwise expand the
strategy in the context of securities regulation. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy
of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001) (contending that the "technical"
provisions of the 1933 Act limiting disclosure of a pending public offering prior to the filing
of a registration statement with the SEC worked "to protect high-prestige wholesale
investment banks, and the retail dealers who sold on their behalf, from competition by
integrated wholesale/retail investment banks that gained market share in the late 1920s").
202. Congress' inertia may be an inevitable byproduct of an institution designed to
ameliorate the instability inherent in majority voting schemes. See Noll & Krier, supra note
197, at 761 (arguing that "political institutions designed to combat the inherent instability of
majority-rule democracy also attenuate the responsiveness of policy to changes in citizen
preferences. Hence, if citizens exhibit intertemporal inconsistencies in preferences regarding
risk regulation, modifications in policy are unlikely fully to reflect these changes in
preferences.").
203. See Seidenfeld, supra note 174, at 515. The utility of political review will be
further undermined by the fact that it is likely to be based on the outcome rather than the
process by which the agency arrived at the rule, leading to an increase in biases in agency
decisionmaking. See id. at 517 ("For accountability to be beneficial, a decisionmaker must
perceive that the evaluation of her decision will be based on the process that she used to
reach the decision, rather than on the outcome of the decision."). Seidenfeld notes that
studies exist indicating that those who are judged based on the outcome of a decision rather
than their decisionmaking process systematically are biased by sunk costs. See id.
204. See Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of
Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2001) ("Given the threat of cuts in appropriations
or statutory limitations on agency authority, agencies have a strong incentive to conform
their actions to be at least acceptable to the committee chair and a majority of committee
members.").
205. See generally Macey, supra note 99 (providing a public choice explanation for the
SEC's continued existence despite its obsolescence).
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SEC's domain beyond the United States not because of overconfidence, but
because SEC regulators want to maximize their authority. 206 But even if
behavioral biases do not affect regulators, the fact that the SEC (or Congress)
may engage in wrongheaded decisions for reasons other than cognitive bias is
cold comfort for those who would rely on regulators to cure behavioral biases
among investors.
Public choice and behavioral theories frequently complement each other.
Self-interested regulators may point to behavioral biases among investors to
expand regulatory protections for investors and the requisite agency resources
to provide such protections. 2 07 The fact that regulators may be motivated to
expand their own prestige and future compensation does not make them any
less susceptible to behavioral biases. Indeed, cognitive illusions may magnify
the harm caused by the more self-interested regulators. Regulators do not fit
neatly into either the opportunistic or completely selfless boxes-a range of
motivations exists. Within this range, cognitive biases may encourage
regulators to equate self-interest and the public interest. An overoptimistic
regulator, for example, may be able to delude himself into believing that a
regulatory change, which coincidentally increases the prestige and power of the
regulator's position, also benefits the market. 208 Former SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt's effort to elevate his position to cabinet level in the wake of a series of
accounting scandals in 2002 affords a salient example of this tendency.2 09
Reducing the cognitive dissonance between benefiting oneself and benefiting
investors may help SEC regulators sleep easier, but it does not help investors.
Similarly, an SEC regulator may convince himself that a particular regulation
that happens to benefit a powerful securities industry group (which may be a
source of future employment for the regulator) also is good for the market.
Self-persuasion will be that much easier if the industry group can threaten
credibly to create trouble with the SEC's overseers on Capitol Hill. Although
we cannot identify the precise motivation behind the actions of the SEC and its
staff, it does not follow from the existence of behavioral biases that more
regulation is the solution.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46 (describing the conflict between the
SEC and the CFTC).
207. Indeed, regulators may attempt to take advantage of the public's behavioral biases
to push forward self-interested regulatory programs. See Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and
Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 280, 299 (2002) ("[P]eople
will tend to either underestimate a relatively high-probability risk, or to overestimate a
relatively low-probability risk. This cognitive bias permits opportunistic politicians and
interest groups to exploit rationally ignorant citizens by convincing them that costly,
draconian legislation is necessary to address low-probability risks.") (footnote omitted).
208. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the self-serving inferences
affecting the SEC).
209. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Chief Draws Ridicule in Quest for Higher Status,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 25, 2002, at C9.
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III. ASSESSING REGULATION TO CORRECT BIASES
The behavioralist critique of investor decision making unfortunately yields
few answers. Investors may act irrationally in their decision making. Investors
also may trade excessively due to a speculative preference. It is difficult to
construct a response to cognitive biases among investors (and other market
participants) absent a theory of why we have behavioral biases. 210 A case has
been made that behavioral phenomena may affect the capital markets. But how
prevalent are the phenomena? Can people correct for their own biases? And if
so how? If behavioral biases are simply hardwired into our brains, then no
amount of effort may be able to change them. Disclosure alone, the principal
regulatory response, fails to address the needs of investors operating under a
dense cloud of behavioral illusions. Moreover, regulators themselves face
cognitive problems of their own. Given these uncertainties, the biases of
regulators, and the costs of regulation, the cure may be worse than the disease.
One response to this uncertainty would be to ignore investors' behavioral
biases altogether and structure regulation on the basis of the rational actor
model. We think that is an unlikely outcome, 211 so we instead provide a
framework for assessing regulatory responses to behavioral biases. Perhaps
more important than measuring the magnitude of biases among investors and
regulators is deciding who will weigh these biases against one another (and
under what burden) in determining: (a) whether a regulatory response is
warranted, and (b) how to structure regulatory decision making to reduce biases
within the regulatory agency (using, for example, judicial review or internal
organizational controls). Ultimately the SEC (or some other regulatory
decisionmaker) must determine whether to promulgate new regulations aimed
at remedying investors' cognitive biases.
Significantly, the very decision on the part of the regulator whether to
intervene to remedy market-based behavioral biases is itself subject to
behavioral biases. Regulators focusing on market-based biases may ignore their
own biases, leading to potentially ill-suited responses to behavioral biases.
Recall that experts may suffer from larger overoptimism and heuristic biases
when applying their expertise in areas outside their primary area. 212 Few SEC
commissioners or staffers are likely to be experts in investor psychology. Such
210. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 74 ("I cannot quantify the net impact
of these kinds of errors, which limits the precise policy lessons we can draw from the
analysis."); Mitchell, supra note 33, at 131 ("As currently conceptualized, legal decision
theory is nothing more than a mess of overgeneralizations about how people exhibit this or
that bias or anomaly under largely unspecified conditions.").
211. This belief is in part due to the recent wave of articles focusing on behavioral
biases among investors. See sources cited supra notes 13-14.
212. See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 28, at 430 (arguing that "experts who have rich
models of the system in question are more likely to exhibit overconfidence than lay people
who have a very limited understanding of these systems").
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regulators may systematically opt for a regulatory solution to the presence of
market behavioral biases. Moreover, while market biases continually face the
pressure of competition, behavioral biases among regulators may go unchecked
if regulators enjoy monopoly authority. Newly installed regulations often take
on a life of their own, leading to more intrusive regulations over time;
regulations to correct cognitive errors are unlikely to be an exception.
Should regulators take an active stand against behavioral biases, moreover,
investors may become overly optimistic that they are fully protected against
their own foibles and therefore reduce their own vigilance against behavioral
biases. Any such intervention to correct for behavioral biases will have gaps,
however, and overoptimistic (or perhaps overly trusting) investors may suffer
even more harm.2 13
Before starting down the road toward a regulatory response, therefore, we
propose a framework for assessing regulation to correct market-based cognitive
biases. Our framework varies along two dimensions: (1) the type of regulator,
and (2) the form of behavioral intervention contemplated. On the first
dimension, we argue that monopolistic regulators should face a stronger
presumption against intervention than regulators facing competition. On the
second dimension, some forms of regulation interfere more directly with the
autonomy of market participants and therefore should overcome a
correspondingly higher presumption against intervention.
We do not attempt here to specify the details of how our framework would
be implemented in practice. In certain cases, implementing the framework may
involve court review of agency decisions using the appropriate presumption
against behavioral bias-targeted intervention. Some policymakers, however,
such as Congress, are not realistically subject to any review. In those cases, our
presumptions are simply cautions for policymakers to heed before attempting to
address behavioral biases. We also do not address how behavioral biases at the
SEC should affect review of the SEC's efforts to deal with more traditional
problems in the securities markets, such as fraud motivated by greed.
Regulators (and courts) are well acquainted with fraud in the financial markets
and the effectiveness of regulatory solutions against fraud.2 14 While biases may
afflict all forms of SEC decision making, regulator biases have their greatest
impact when regulators are focused on how to deal with uncertain and
amorphous issues-such as interventions to correct market-based biases. In an
213. Cf W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES
FOR RISK 234-42 (1992) (describing the lulling effect).
214. Of course, even in well-known areas, regulators may abuse their authority to
expand regulation unnecessarily. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 99 (providing a public choice
critique of the SEC). Some biases, such as overconfidence, may affect regulators regardless
of their experience with a particular type of intervention. An argument therefore exists that
our presumption approach should apply to all regulatory interventions on the part of the
SEC. We are focused here, however, on interventions to correct behavioral biases, and we
leave the possibility of a more general set of presumptions for another paper.
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area of heightened uncertainty, the SEC's tendency to act out of a confirmation
bias, with overconfidence, and following self-serving inferences may become
accentuated. We define three levels of presumptions:
Presumption Standard
Strong Presumption Highest likelihood of net benefits of
regulation and no less restrictive
alternative
Intermediate Presumption Substantial likelihood of net benefits of
regulation and no less restrictive
alternative
Weak Presumption A likelihood of net benefits of regulation
While the precise level of each presumption is somewhat arbitrary, the
notion that different forms of regulations to correct market-based biases require
varying levels of justification is not. We turn now to a more detailed
description of the two dimensions along which we set our presumptions against
regulation targeting behavioral biases.
A. Regulatory Decisionmakers
In this section we discuss how the framework for assessing regulatory
intervention should vary for (1) monopolistic and centralized regulators such as
the SEC; (2) federal courts; (3) regulators facing competition from other
sources of regulatory protections for investors (including market-based
regulators such as securities exchanges).
1. Monopolistic regulators.
We posit that regulatory decisionmakers with monopoly authority-such as
the SEC with respect to most domestic securities regulation-should have to
overcome a strong presumption against intervention to correct cognitive biases.
The SEC should be required to demonstrate a high likelihood of net benefits
from the regulation as well as no less restrictive alternative.
Why impose such a strong presumption against intervention by the SEC
and similar monopolistic regulators? Simply put, market forces are unlikely to
correct the biases affecting monopolistic regulators. Without competitive
pressure, biases may flourish. Just as a lack of competition gives regulators the
ability to slack or direct rents from regulation to themselves, monopolistic
regulators may also satisfice, employ flawed heuristics, and suffer from other
cognitive biases with minimal feedback and no direct penalties. To be sure,
extremely poor regulation may eventually produce a market backlash if
investors exit the capital markets. But there remains considerable leeway for
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behavioral flaws to go uncorrected within the SEC. 2 15
The SEC is not an unconstrained monopolist. Congress controls the SEC
through its power over the agency's purse strings. In addition, Congress may
legislate changes in the SEC's mission and any other aspect of the current
securities regulatory regime through legislation. Courts also review SEC
decisions. As we have discussed above, however, neither congressional
oversight nor court review can correct all (or even most) biases among
regulators. More significantly, the current interplay between Congress, the
courts, and the SEC is not subject to significant competitive pressure. If
investors do not have a choice of regulatory regime, the checks and balances
represented by judicial and congressional oversight of the SEC may not be the
most cost-effective means of curtailing the influence of cognitive bias on
regulation. Congress, the SEC, and perhaps even judges may bend to political
pressure (especially from concentrated interest groups). This interplay of
political forces is not necessarily focused on investor welfare but, instead, may
reflect both the interests and biases of specific groups. Judicial review and
congressional oversight do not dissuade us from recommending a strong
presumption against intervention by the SEC to correct market-based
behavioral biases.
The combination of behavioral biases and public choice motivations of
SEC regulators may also generate a one-way ratchet effect: Regulations are
easy to promulgate but difficult to remove. Overconfidence may fuel self-
interest to push the SEC to implement new regulations. Once new regulations
are in place, the confirmation bias may lead SEC regulators to then further "buy
in" to the usefulness of such regulations. Why question the status quo, which
has proven so effective in the past? Feedback tending to show that regulations
are imposing costs in excess of benefits will be downplayed because of the
SEC's confidence in its regulatory abilities.
Various interest groups may conform their businesses to the regulatory
status quo; some groups (such as attorneys, accountants, and investment
bankers) may derive additional revenue from the market barriers erected by the
regulations. Moreover, even poorly conceived regulations may benefit a small
number of investors. Removing such regulations may produce a net social
benefit by reducing costs for the overall pool of investors. Nevertheless, the
minority of investors that benefit from the regulations may suffer very visible
and concentrated losses,- spurring regulators and Congress (operating under the
availability heuristic) to preserve such regulations. The widely dispersed, and
thus less observable, potential benefits from reducing regulatory costs will tend
to be ignored. The SEC therefore has strong incentives to add, but few
incentives to pare, regulations. Because imposing regulations is often a one-
way street, monopolistic regulators should bear a heavy burden in
215. In part this is due to the fundamental strength and liquidity of the U.S. markets.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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demonstrating the need to start down the street in the first place.
Further supporting the strong presumption against monopolistic regulators
is the risk that heavy-handed regulatory interventions designed to address
behavioral flaws may backfire. 2 16 While flawed, the present regulatory regime
(which generally ignores investors' behavioral biases) does a reasonable job of
protecting investors. The daunting task of weeding out behavioral anomalies
among investors and securities professionals may inadvertently reduce the
value of the present regime.
2. The courts.
Courts, in addition to reviewing SEC decisions, also directly implement
statutory and regulatory provisions through their interpretations. For example,
courts play the leading role in interpreting "materiality. '2 17 Although judges
suffer from their own behavioral biases, we nevertheless propose only an
intermediate standard for evaluating judge-made law intended to deal with
investors' behavioral biases. Proponents would have to demonstrate to a judge
(or judges on appeal reviewing a lower court decision) substantial evidence that
the remedy chosen advances the interests of investors while not burdening the
markets more than necessary. 218
We support an intermediate presumption for several reasons. First,
decentralized judge-made law poses less danger to the market than does the
SEC's centralized decisions. Although SEC regulators may seek to expand
their regulatory authority and prestige, judges are unlikely to share this
motivation. Judges may seek to maximize their own welfare, but for many
judges self-interest does not translate into greater regulatory intervention into
the securities markets. The judge writing an opinion will typically be limited in
his involvement to the specific case and will not reap any benefits ex post from
greater regulatory intervention. Judges, therefore, are much less likely than the
SEC to interpret the securities laws to expand their authority through
unnecessary interference with the markets. Second, judges do not suffer from
the groupthink that plagues SEC regulators. Dispersed and independent judges,
unlike SEC regulators, will have heterogeneous views on how to handle
securities markets problems. Judging can be a lonely job, but it does encourage
judges to think for themselves. 2 19 Finally, the opinions of judges are subject to
216. Investors, for example, may come to believe that they are more protected than
they really are due to the overconfidence bias. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (defining
materiality for proxies).
218. As we discuss below, we do not provide an explicit plan on how to impose such a
presumption on courts. At a minimum, courts could voluntarily adopt such an approach to
behavioral-bias-oriented remedies.
219. There is evidence, however, that judges may systematically decide cases along
ideological lines. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
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some measure of feedback. Federal district and circuit court judges face the
possibility of appellate review. 220 While monopolistic regulators may also face
eventual court review, review of lower court opinions often occurs more
frequently (and sooner in time). 221 Moreover, unlike monopolistic regulators,
lower court judges benefit from seeing how other judges handle similar
behavioral issues, which encourages an open-minded approach. Indirectly,
judges compete with one another to have their views cited in the opinions of
other judges. Large numbers of citations lead to greater prestige for the
judges.222
Disclosure demonstrates the comparative advantage of courts in responding
to market behavioral biases. If investors have bounded rationality, more
disclosure simply makes the matter worse. The SEC, however, presently pays
no attention to the problem of limited investor attention. The SEC has virtually
ignored the problem of too much disclosure.22 3 Every crisis of confidence in
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997) (providing evidence from a sample of environmental
law-related cases that judicial decisions in the D.C. Circuit are significantly correlated with
the political party of the President who nominated particular judges); see also Tracey E.
George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74
WASH. L. REV. 213, 238-39 nn.128-30 (1999) (collecting studies). But see Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002) (finding
little evidence of a political pattern in judicial interpretations of the "strong inference"
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
220. We would also impose an intermediate presumption on appeal against judge-
fashioned remedies targeting behavioral biases.
221. The large grant of authority to the SEC to engage in regulatory rulemaking under
the securities laws limits the extent of possible judicial review of SEC rulemaking. See, e.g.,
Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994) ("The Commission shall have authority
from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act] .... ); Exchange Act § 23, 15 U.S.C. §
78w (1994). Additionally, aggrieved parties face a general requirement that parties exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. For an overview of the exhaustion
doctrine, see Rebecca L. Donnellan, The Exhaustion Doctrine Should Not Be a Doctrine with
Exceptions, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 361 (2001) (discussing among other things the many
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine). Note that Section 9 of the Securities Act and Section
25 of the Exchange Act explicitly authorize parties aggrieved by a SEC order to seek review
at a circuit court. See Securities Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1994); Exchange Act § 25, 15
U.S.C. § 78y (1994).
222. It is unclear, nonetheless, how many judges in fact will actively compete over
citations. Only a few "superstar" judges may in fact capture the lion share of citations
(making it not worthwhile for nonsuperstar judges to even get into the competition). See,
e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 108-09 (2002). For a proposal to induce more competition among circuit
court judges, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2004).
223. See Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions,
and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 324 (1986) ("[A]lthough
mandated disclosure to protect investors is a long-standing, albeit widely debated, policy of
corporate law, the perils of information overload are virtually unnoticed in the field.").
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the securities markets is met with a raft of new disclosure requirements
(coincidentally expanding the SEC's authority); seldom, if ever, does the
agency subtract from the laundry list of disclosure requirements. Enron, for
example, led to a new set of disclosures for special purpose entities, but no
reduction in required disclosure in other areas.224 Is everything supposed to be
important to the average investor? In contrast to the SEC's approach, the
materiality standards devised by courts reflect the cognitive limitations facing
investors. In announcing the materiality standard, the Supreme Court worried
that a lower standard might cause management "to bury the shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking." 225 The SEC has shown no such restraint.
Despite the advantage of judges relative to the SEC, we think good
arguments support an intermediate presumption against regulatory intervention
by judges to correct cognitive biases. Dispersed nonexpert judges may lack
expertise in evaluating intervention; while perhaps better motivated and less
prone toward overconfidence than the SEC, the lack of expertise still leaves
judicial regulation of the securities market prone to error. Judges may also face
their own set of behavioral biases. 226 While self-interested judges may not
maximize regulatory authority, they may instead opt for simple heuristic-like
rules to get cases off their dockets.227 Judges may prefer to dispose of cases
quickly, particularly if securities law cases are a disfavored class due to their
complexity or other reasons. Judges that generate quick and simple heuristics to
dispose of such cases will tend to have their rules cited more often than judges
who rely on standards that look to the totality of the facts and circumstances.
While heuristics may cut down on decisionmaking costs, they may not produce
a rule of law that provides the most cost-effective protection for investors and
the capital markets. To the extent heuristics are both over and underinclusive,
judge-made securities opinions aimed at investor behavioral biases may
produce error-prone rules. Judges may also get caught up in framing effects.
Decisions posed as a question of whether to avoid a loss to investors may result
in different judicial decisions compared with decisions posed as a question of
224. See Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About
Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent Liabilities and
Commitments, 67 Fed. Reg. 68054-01 (proposed Nov. 8, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 249).
225. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976); see also Kohn
v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 458 F.2d 255 (3d
Cir. 1972) (stating the buried facts doctrine of materiality).
226. See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 20, at 577 ("From the psychological
perspective, the courts are probably the institution least well-suited to making policy
decisions that avoid cognitive traps.").
227. Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 222, at 100-05; see Hillary A. Sale, Judging
Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 903 (2002). Donald C. Langevoort's response can be
found in Donald Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated To Create "Good" Securities Fraud
Doctrine?, 51 EMORY L.J. 309 (2002).
[Vol. 56:1
October 2003] BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE SEC
whether to increase overall investor welfare. 228
228. Robert Prentice's writing unintentionally exemplifies the risk of error by judges
who would interpret the securities laws from the perspective of behavioral law and
economics. Taking on a "judging" role himself in second guessing courts, Prentice has
written about the "irrational auditor" who jeopardizes a firm's reputation by signing off on
misleading financial statements. See Prentice, supra note 147. Prentice argues at length that
behavioral law and economics demonstrates the likelihood that auditors will succumb to this
seemingly irrational risk to their firm's reputation. Prentice is responding to Judge Frank
Easterbrook's dicta, in dismissing a securities fraud complaint against an accounting firm,
that it would have been irrational for the firm and its auditors to jeopardize their reputations
through complicity in an alleged fraud by the firm's client. See id. at 135-36 (citing DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990)). Capital markets share Easterbrook's
intuition: Stock price reactions are stronger to earnings reports for firms with Big 8 (now Big
4) auditors. See Siew Hong Teoh & T.J. Wong, Perceived Auditor Quality and the Earnings
Response Coefficient, 68 Accr. REV. 346 (1993).
Prentice's attack is based on a misreading of Easterbrook's decision, apparently the
result of Prentice failing to recognize the application of one of the principal cognitive biases
upon which he relies (the base rate fallacy). Easterbrook's dismissal of the complaint was
based not on blind faith that people do not act irrationally but rather the plaintiffs' failure to
provide any evidence that irrational acts had occurred. Easterbrook argues:
People sometimes act irrationally, but indulging ready inferences of irrationality would too
easily allow the inference that ordinary business reverses are fraud. One who believes that
another has behaved irrationally has to make a strong case. The complaint does not come
close. It does not identify any of E & W's auditors or explain what that person might have
had to gain from covering up Continental's wrongs.
DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 629 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Easterbrook dismisses the
complaint, not because of an irrebuttable presumption of rationality, but because the
plaintiffs have alleged no facts to rebut that presumption. The complaint alleged no facts
about the accounting firm that would distinguish it from any other accounting firm whose
client suffered a business reversal. C.f Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the
Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1239 (2002) (providing account of how auditors at Arthur Andersen
were compromised in the Enron audit). Far from ignoring the risk of cognitive bias,
Easterbrook imposes a rule that avoids the temptation to fall into the base rate fallacy. Most
business reversals are just business reversals. The overall rate of fraud by corporations is
very low, and the percentage of those frauds in which the auditors participate is lower still.
Prentice acknowledges these facts, but fails to recognize their significance for Easterbrook's
approach. See Prentice, supra note 147 ("[I]n the general run of things, there is no reason to
suspect that auditors are auditing fraudulently or recklessly, any more than there is reason to
believe that drivers are driving recklessly. Most audits are completed competently, just as
most car trips are."). The temptation-when faced by the salient evidence of huge losses that
typically prompt securities fraud suits-is to ignore this very low base rate in assessing
whether there has been fraud. See id. at 158-59 (discussing representativeness heuristic).
That temptation is enhanced by the "hindsight bias"; the auditors "must have known" of the
fraud when it was being committed in light of the subsequently revealed evidence. See
Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT AND UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982) (quoted in Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A
Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998))
("In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight.
They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it
as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it happened. People believe that others
should have been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case."). The
"very high barrier," see Prentice, supra note 147, at 138, erected by Easterbrook simply
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Finally, judge-made law may suffer from its own form of the one-way
ratchet effect. Judges may be less likely to intrude on the market than SEC
officials, but once judges take behavioral biases into account, the force of
precedent may lead other judges addressing similar issues to adopt the same
position in subsequent cases. Judges face little competitive pressure to
overcome their cognitive failings.229 Without the disciplining effect of a
potential loss of market share or other feedback, we doubt that judges will learn
to overcome their cognitive failings. Market participants also will adjust their
behavior to take into account new judge-made securities law. Consider a
judicial opinion that defines materiality to reflect the disclosure needs of
behaviorally challenged investors. Investors, once aware of this change, may be
less skeptical in interpreting information (given the added protection of
antifraud liability), which may then leave them more exposed to fraud.
Subsequent judges may then find even prior, ill-advised changes to the
definition of materiality now justified given the reduced vigilance of investors.
Because of the effect of precedent and the practical difficulties of reversing past
judicial opinions, we favor an intermediate presumption against allowing
judges to take investor behavioral biases into account in their decisions.
3. Competitive regulators.
Our current regime, under which competition counters the behavioral
biases of investors, but not those of regulators, is not preordained. One could,
instead, subject securities regulation to the forces of market competition. 230
Securities regulators faced with competition would have less latitude to ignore
their own behavioral biases. Regulators that failed to organize their institutional
structure to reduce the impact of such biases would lose companies and
investors to competing jurisdictions.23 1 For this reason, we propose that
requires the plaintiff to offer some evidence that this case differs from the overwhelming
percentage of nonfraud cases represented by the base rate. That approach makes perfect
sense from the perspective of behavioral economics. Prentice's selective use of cognitive
defects is, at a minimum, a warning that judges must handle the insights of behavioral
economics with care. In the absence of an organizing theory of cognitive bias, particular
biases can be invoked to support or criticize almost any judicial decision.
229. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, supra note 189, at 64 ("Civil engineers who build faulty
buildings will quickly find themselves without clients, but courts are public resources that do
not face true competitive pressures. Judges surely have some incentives to make good law
and avoid illusions of judgment, but they lack the incentives that other institutions face.")
(footnote omitted).
230. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman, supra note 10; Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
231. See Arlen, supra note 20, at 1782 ("[I]n some circumstances, high quality firms
may have an incentive to encourage consumers to focus on the risks associated with low
quality products."). The one area that the SEC does face competition-listings by foreign
issuers--does reflect the influence of market pressures. Foreign issuers are relieved of a
number of the more onerous requirements imposed on domestic public companies. See
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regulators facing substantial competition from other regulators must overcome
only a weak presumption against intervention. Under this weak presumption,
regulators need only show a likelihood of net benefits when intervening to
correct behavioral biases. 232
The global capital markets have already moved toward greater competition.
Investors today can choose where to place their money, including most
prominently the NYSE, the London Stock Exchange, the Deutsche B6rse, and
the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 233 To the extent behavioral biases reduce the value
of one of these securities markets, competition provides a large incentive for
regulators to implement reforms to reduce such biases. The lack of any obvious
responses to behavioral biases by these competing securities exchanges calls
into question the magnitude of such biases. The choice present in the global
capital markets, nevertheless, is somewhat limited. Investors cannot invest on
Securities Exchange Act Rule 3a12-3(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-3 (2003) (exempting foreign
issuers from insider trading restrictions and proxy rules). Policies deemed essential to
investor protection when applied to domestic companies are mysteriously nonessential when
applied to foreign companies. Regulation FD, for example, applies only to domestic issuers.
But see Merritt B. Fox, Regulation FD and Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains and
Opportunities, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 653 (2001) (arguing that Regulation FD's exemption for
foreign issuers is justified). And American markets are already feeling the effect of the
reaction by Congress and the SEC to Enron, WorldCom, and other accounting scandals.
Foreign companies that were considering U.S. listings have decided against it; some foreign
issuers may decide to withdraw from the American market rather than comply with these
new regulations. See Porsche Won't List Shares in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at
C16 ("A factor in Porsche's decision was the new U.S. rule demanding that chief executives
and chief financial officers of U.S.-listed companies attest to the accuracy of their financial
results."). Perhaps for this reason, the SEC's proposed rules on audit committee
requirements pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while not completely exempting foreign
issuers, provide for a number of specific exemptions. See Standards Relating to Listed
Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 2638-01 (proposed Jan. 17, 2003) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274).
232. Despite the current dearth of competition, some adherents of the behavioralist
school seem oblivious to the possibility that the existing regulatory structure is anything less
than perfect. Robert Prentice, for example, claims: "If issuers and brokers opt into a
relatively full measure of public regulation, then investor regulation really would not
accomplish much. It would not save any money or create any meaningful efficiencies.
Issuers, for example, would continue to bear the expense of full disclosure and antifraud
liability." Prentice, supra note 14, at 1408. Prentice implicitly assumes that even in a system
of full choice everyone would view the present regime as "optimal." Every regulation is the
best in this best of all possible regulated worlds. If the SEC faced competition, is it realistic
to expect that the SEC would not change any of its policies? The available evidence from
markets in which government and private entities compete to provide a service contradicts
this assumption. To take a familiar example, it is difficult to believe that government
institutions of higher learning are not affected by competition from private universities. Our
personal experience at state universities is that the policies of private universities are a very
real constraint on the (in)efficiencies of our schools.
233. For a discussion on the growing competition among global securities exchanges,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757
(2002).
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the NYSE without automatically coming under the protection of the U.S.
securities laws. 234 For investors and issuers desiring access to the U.S. capital
markets, the SEC still enjoys a regulatory monopoly.
Under what conditions will regulatory competition enhance investor
welfare (the so-called "race to the top")? On the one hand, rational and fully
informed investors will incorporate the value to investors of an issuer's
selection of a particular regulatory regime into the company's stock price.
Issuers will then have an incentive to opt into regimes offering value-increasing
investor protections. On the other hand, investors that operate under extreme
levels of behavioral biases may miscalculate the value of competing sets of
regulatory protections. If so, competition may not improve investor welfare.
Nonetheless, even when behavioral biases affect investors, different
investors may be more or less affected by such biases. Larger institutional
investors may have enough self-awareness of their own susceptibility to
behavioral biases to appreciate a regime that protects them against such
biases. 2 35 For example, an institution may realize that its managers may suffer
from overconfidence, the availability heuristic, and so on. If a regulatory
regime truly solves these problems, the institution may protect itself from the
foibles of its own agents by adopting a policy of investing only in companies
opting into a protective regime (or discounting companies that do not). To the
234. For a discussion of the current tie between securities markets and the securities
regulatory regime, see Choi & Guzman, supra note 10, at 918.
235. And the endowment effect suggests that investors will be reluctant to cede
protections that they currently enjoy, even if they would have been unwilling to pay the price
to obtain the protections in the first instance. See Jack L. Knetsch & J.A. Sinden, Willingness
to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in
Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (reporting results from a series of experiments
showing that people demand more in compensation for a loss compared with their
willingness to pay for an equivalent-sized gain). If so, even the cognitively challenged may
then free ride off the selectiveness of more informed and rational investors. On the other side
of the equation, executives of firms choosing a listing are likely to underestimate their
probability of being sanctioned by a regulator (to the extent that only a low probability of
being sanctioned exists). See Weinstein, supra note 28, at 810 (finding that people
underestimate their probability of being sued); see also Christine Jolls, Behavioral
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1653, 1663 (1998) ("It
is difficult to come up with examples of events giving rise to individual liability the
probability of which is likely to be overestimated rather than ... underestimated."). (Of
course, they may periodically overestimate after recent salient examples of enforcement.)
This tendency to underestimate personal risks is particularly pronounced for events that are
perceived to be within the individual's control. See Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for
Optimism?: The Relationship Between Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias, 15 J.
Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 9 (1996). Consequently, corporate managers will perceive little
risk to selecting regulatory regimes with the most vigorously enforced standards. Investors,
by contrast, will be less likely to be overoptimistic in their chances of avoiding fraud, which
is largely beyond their ability to control. If so, cognitive biases may help fuel a "race to the
top," or even overshooting the top. Of course, this argument may be all wrong. Without
knowing the extent of biases or how they interact, predictions of how policies will work in
practice are little more than guesswork.
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extent that large institutional investors' decisions are incorporated into the
stock market price, smaller investors may free ride on the price since it
incorporates information about the value of behavioral protections provided
through a particular regulatory regime.
Even without any conscious recognition of behavioral biases, institutional
and individual investors will flock to regimes offering higher overall returns
(for a given level of risk). If behavioral biases reduce returns then investors
eventually will abandon such regimes and search for alternatives offering
higher returns. Issuers seeking the capital of those investors will then follow
suit. For example, suppose the NYSE mandates a minimal trading delay, which
reduces the effect of behavioral biases, increasing overall returns for
investors. 236 Assume that NASDAQ does not adopt such a delay. Even without
knowledge of the precise mechanisms by which returns are increased, investors
generally will shift to companies trading on the NYSE, as returns increase
(leading more companies to list on the NYSE, thereby increasing overall
trading volume and the profitability of NYSE member brokers).
The market, of course, may not behave so efficiently; the example of a
trading delay above is unlikely as long as exchanges' profitability is tied to
trading volume. 237 Or maybe the market will be unable to overcome pervasive
behavioral biases affecting the estimation of institutional investors of their own
biases or difficulties that investors face in comparing returns across markets.
Such inefficiencies are plausible; the recent performance of the U.S. stock
market supports the possibility of stock bubbles.238 Some market participants
may attempt to take systematic advantage of the behavioral biases of the less
sophisticated (and opt into regimes facilitating such opportunistic behavior).
And to the extent new (and behaviorally naive) investors constantly enter the
market, opportunistic participants may have a steady pool of investors upon
which to prcy. In the long run, bubbles burst. Eventually, investors may
become suspicious of a particular regulatory regime fostering opportunism.
But, during this "long run," many investors may in fact lose large sums of
money.
To reduce the possibility of only a "long run" adjustment, the government
could rely on a hybrid between government oversight and market-based
regulators, including existing self-regulatory organizations. Securities
236. For a discussion of trading delays and their role in reducing behavioral biases, see
infra Part III.B.3.
237. Trading delays, like any other transaction cost, are likely to reduce the overall
number of trades, an unattractive outcome for the exchanges. See Adam C. Pritchard, Self-
Regulation and Securities Markets, 26 REGULATION 32 (2003).
238. Certainly the belief that a stock market bubble existed toward the end of the 1990s
is prevalent in the financial press. See Dennis K. Berman, Julia Angwin & Chip Cummins,
Tricks of the Trade: As Market Bubble Neared End, Bogus Swaps Provided a Lift, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Al; lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Fingers Point at New Jersey Fund: Pension
Operation Racks Up Huge Losses Since Bubble Burst, Prompting Suits and Shake-up, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at CI.
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exchanges, for example, already have incentives to implement investor-related
protections. 239 To the extent investors are better protected when investing in
firms that trade on a particular exchange, the exchange (and its members) will
earn greater revenues in the form of listing fees as well as commissions on
trading volume. 24 0 Just as a securities exchange can protect rational investors
(who may lack information or expertise to protect themselves), exchanges can
also provide protections for behaviorally challenged investors. Exchanges may
also have more expertise than more distant regulators in determining the types
and magnitudes of biases affecting investors.24 1
The SEC may then enhance the competition among exchanges, monitoring
the regulation provided by private exchanges.24 2 As under the current self-
regulatory organization (SRO) regime, 243 we see value in having exchanges
justify their proposed regulations to the SEC. Requiring private exchanges to
submit to SEC review may lead the exchanges to avoid many possible
behavioral biases themselves. 244 If private regulators must justify their actions,
they will be less likely to employ shortcut heuristics. Spelling out the case for
new private regulations may also help expose over-reliance on salient
information and combat overconfidence. Moreover, the SEC, with its expertise,
may prove a better monitor than the judiciary or Congress. An independent
SEC may also avoid cognitive dissonance lock-in effects in reviewing private
regulatory actions adopted by exchanges and other SROs.
The SEC therefore may have a limited role to play in providing a safety net
for regulatory competition, protecting against the fear that behavioral biases
may lead issuers to select ever-decreasing levels of investor protection.
Moreover, placing the SEC in a secondary position of monitoring exchange-
provided protections lessens the risk that the SEC will use its monopoly power
239. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997);
Pritchard, supra note 10, at 925.
240. But see Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges:
The Case of Market Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1995) (arguing that exchanges will
have suboptimal incentives to combat market manipulation because it may increase trading
volume).
241. Prentice argues that investors did not bargain for the ight level of disclosure
before the passage of the federal securities laws. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1453. But as
Prentice acknowledges, there is no evidence that investors demanded more regulation than
the NYSE provided. Nonetheless, Prentice claims to know that investors failed to bargain for
the correct level of disclosure. He does not explain, however, how he knows what the right
level is. Regardless, the more relevant question than what the NYSE did in the nineteenth
century is what would the NYSE be doing today if the SEC had not been invented?
242. See Pritchard, supra note 10.
243. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C.§ 78s (2003). The SEC has
the power to approve, disapprove, or modify SRO rules as it "deems necessary or
appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization" among other
things. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2003).
244. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999) (surveying evidence on the effects of
accountability on decisionmaking).
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to push forward unwarranted protections (or protections designed to expand the
SEC's own authority). Once limited to reviewing regulations (rather than
imposing its own regulations), the SEC's confirmation bias will be reduced.
Overconfidence will also play less of a role in SEC review to the extent that the
SEC itself does not initially generate exchange-based regulatory initiatives (or
become involved in their implementation). 245
When behavioral biases pervade the market, competition may not fully
weed them out. Nonetheless, even possibly imperfect competition may better
address behavioral biases than would a monopolistic regulator. While the
possibility of a "race to the bottom" theoretically exists (fueled perhaps by
opportunistic issuers and other market participants seeking to exploit
behaviorally challenged investors), we believe that the presence of more
rational investors (and a pricing mechanism to transmit their choices to others),
as well as the ongoing desire of investors to seek markets with higher returns,
reduces the downside likelihood of a "race to the bottom." Moreover, without
the threat of competition, we cannot know if biases are inevitable or merely an
excuse for poor regulatory decisionmaking. 246 Indeed, competition may lead
regulatory regimes seeking to attract investors to adopt those oversight
mechanisms (including judicial review and legislative oversight) that provide
the most cost-effective means of reducing biases among regulators.
Competition would provide greater assurance that judicial review and
legislative oversight reduce regulator biases to the net benefit of investor
welfare. 24 7
245. Significantly, we focus on the SEC's authority to review exchange-based
decisions. We are less supportive of the SEC's power to modify unilaterally exchange rules
(including adding new rules), which empowers the SEC to force exchanges to adopt SEC
initiatives. See Securities Exchange Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2003). This authority
opens the backdoor for the SEC to use exchanges to forward its own mandatory regulatory
agenda subject to the behavioral biases plaguing regulators without any tempering from
competition.
246. The possibility of regulatory competition may not eliminate all biases within
regulators. As with private securities market institutions, organizational illusions will remain
within regulators. See supra text accompanying notes 74-94 (discussing the behavioral
biases afflicting securities market institutions). Nonetheless, those biases that persist will be
those that make the regulators more effective. For example, overconfidence and groupthink
may, to some extent, help make the SEC a cohesive body with high morale. As with private
organizations, the competitive environment then necessarily limits the impact of such biases.
Where overconfidence and groupthink are so extensive as to reduce the value of the SEC's
provided regulations to investors in a competitive environment, investors will switch to the
regulatory protections of a competing supplier.
247. Despite our analysis, some may remain unconvinced of the value of regulatory
competition in reducing the influence of behavioral biases on regulators. Those skeptical of
competition, therefore, may wish to adopt a greater presumption against regulatory
intervention targeting behavioral biases (including possible intermediate or strict levels of
presumptions against intervention). Our central point, however, is that those who question
the ability of even competitive regulators to effectively counteract investors' biases should
also question the ability of monopolistic regulators (cushioned against any form of
competitive pressure) to do so, lending support for our strict presumption against
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
B. Forms of Regulatory Intervention
Behaviorally challenged regulators present the distinct risk of ill-advised
intervention to correct investor behavioral biases. Moreover, the same
behaviorally challenged regulators may refuse to recognize their errors,
compounding the costs to investors over time. The form of regulatory
intervention, in tum, has considerable influence on the overall cost of potential
regulatory error. The presumption against regulatory intervention should
correspondingly vary with the magnitude of potential error.
In this section we canvass three forms of intervention: (1) regulations that
restrict the range of available investments, directly supplanting market
decisionmakers; (2) regulations that adjust existing securities regulatory
provisions in ways that may indirectly supplant the market (through excessive
regulatory costs leading to fewer investment choices); and (3) regulations that
influence investors' decisions, but only minimally restrict their available
choices.
1. Restricting investment options.
We contend that regulators seeking to supplant the market in order to
correct behavioral biases should bear the burden of overcoming a strong
presumption against regulation. Such market-supplanting interventions should
be supported by evidence demonstrating a high likelihood of net benefits of the
regulations and the lack of any less restrictive alternative, thereby minimizing
potential errors.
For those convinced of the severity of behavioral biases among investors,
depriving investors of certain investment options has obvious appeal. The most
extreme version of this approach is merit regulation (surprisingly ignored by
adherents of the behavioral approach) under which regulators simply remove
"undesirable" investments from the market altogether.248 Put simply, if
investors lack the ability to make good investment decisions then why not have
regulators make this decision for investors?
Behavioral economics, if taken seriously, would seem to point to merit
regulation. Will behavioral economics take us back to the quasi-socialist
interventionism advocated by William 0. Douglas and his fellow travelers?249
Given the well-known defects of merit regulation, this agenda seems unlikely
intervention for relatively monopolistic regulators.
248. Note that it is unclear what exactly constitutes "undesirable" investments. High
risk investments are not necessarily undesirable if they provide a correspondingly high
return.
249. See William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 524 (1934)
(bemoaning the lack of merit regulation in the Securities Act: most investors have neither
"the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate the mass of information in the registration
statement").
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to gather steam.250 Merit regulation founders on the problem facing any central
planner in a complex economy: Even expert regulators cannot begin to assign
relative values to every single investment. Throw in the element of change in a
dynamic economy and the problem becomes overwhelming. Indeed, the limits
of regulators attempting merit regulation can be viewed as one of bounded
rationality. Decentralized market actors following the "invisible hand" bring
much greater aggregate processing power and localized knowledge to bear in
determining the proper allocation of capital and other resources to meet
people's preferences. 25 1 No single regulatory body, no matter how expert, can
hope to match the capacity to value securities of greed-driven market
participants.252 The worldwide collapse of socialism leaves little room for
debate on the superiority of decentralized markets over central planners. Taken
to its logical extreme, behavioral economics offers the questionable benefit of
North Korean-style efficiency to our financial markets.
Perhaps we are unduly pessimistic; less invasive regulatory options are
available. One example would be precluding trading in the (worthless) shares
of bankrupt companies. 2 53 Regulators also could require certain investors to
invest through market intermediaries. 254 Regulators could similarly restrict the
choices available to unsophisticated investors to a subset of the investment
opportunities in the market. This strategy has already been implemented in part.
For nonaccredited individual investors, for example, few (if any) opportunities
exist to invest in securities of firms that choose not to register their securities in
a public offering. 255 Nonetheless, any issuer may overcome this barrier by
registering its securities offering with the SEC and making the required
disclosures, thereby gaining access to all investors.2 56 Proponents of the view
that investors suffer from behavioral biases may wonder whether the disclosure
250. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 563-67 (1985) (criticizing state blue sky merit regulation);
Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CiN. L. REV. 471 (1993) (chronicling the
demise of merit regulation).
251. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner & W.B. Todd eds., Liberty Classics 1981)
(1776).
252. Ivan Boesky during the 1980s actively pushed the notion that "greed is good." See
DOUGLAS FRANTZ, LEVINE & CO.: WALL STREET'S INSIDER TRADING SCANDAL 145 (1987)
(noting that Boesky stated at a UC Berkeley Business School graduation that "Greed is all
right, by the way. I want you to know that. I think greed is healthy. You can be greedy and
still feel good about yourself.").
253. See Marc Hopkins, Shares of Distressed Firms Still Sell, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22,
2003, at B4 (discussing active trading in shares of bankrupt companies even after companies
have disclosed that common stock will be wiped out in reorganization).
254. See Choi, supra note 66, at 290-96.
255. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (describing private placements).
256. Public registration involves, among other things, the creation and filing of a
registration statement with the SEC. For a description of the registration process, see JAMES
D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 211-321 (2d ed. 1997).
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required for a public offering in fact addresses the needs of the behaviorally
challenged. 257 Those who doubt the value of disclosure in rectifying behavioral
biases among investors may instead wish to cabin the securities choices
available to investors with higher levels of behavioral biases.
Although potentially the most effective means of addressing behavioral
biases among investors, regulations designed to supplant market
decisionmakers also pose the greatest risk of error. To begin, it may be difficult
to sort the investors who need to be protected from themselves from those who
should be given free rein in devising their investment strategies. Competitive
pressures may suffice for investors who act completely rationally and seek to
maximize their overall investment return (given their preference for risk). On
the other hand, policymakers might improve overall investor welfare by
limiting securities transactions if they were confident that they were curtailing
primarily speculatively motivated trades. 258 This response, of course, assumes
that policy intervention to discourage such trades is justified.259
How do we distinguish investors recklessly speculating from those
prudently rebalancing their portfolios based on fundamental analysis of
company prospects? These trades all look alike as they come across the ticker.
How can we sort these rational traders from those investors wracked with
cognitive illusions, loss aversion tendencies, and the availability heuristic?
Regulators who cannot make such distinctions run the risk of providing
unneeded and costly regulatory protections for many investors who do not want
or need them.
The problem of partitioning investors is not new. The private placement
exemption under the securities laws allows investors who can "fend for
themselves" more latitude to invest in relatively less-regulated private
placement offerings. 260 Even in this well-trodden field, controversy exists on
how to determine if an investor qualifies as sophisticated.26 1 Determining
which investors may suffer from behavioral biases poses an even more
257. See supra Part 1I.B (questioning the ability of disclosure to correct for behavioral
biases).
258. See Stout, supra note 61 (contending that many investors engage in wasteful,
speculative trades).
259. See supra Part I.B (discussing the possibility that some investors have preferences
for speculation in their investments and noting that the argument to hinder such preferences
is far from clear).
260. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (introducing the concept of
investors being able to "fend for themselves" in interpreting the scope of § 4(2)'s exemption
from the Securities Act's registration requirements under § 5). A safe harbor for private
placements is provided under Regulation D of the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-
508 (2003).
261. See C. Edward Fletcher, II1, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081; Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and
Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291
(1994); see also Choi, supra note 66, at 310-18 (proposing both mandatory and voluntary
licensing schemes to distinguish among investors).
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daunting task. Because no unifying theory explains why we suffer from
behavioral biases, we cannot predict which investors suffer from biases, nor
can we gauge the magnitude of these biases. Generalizations are possible.
Expert investors, for example, may suffer from fewer availability and framing
biases. Their experience and training "allow" them to "see" such biases and
avoid them. For example, Wall Street veterans warn newcomers "Don't
confuse brains and a bull market," a reminder about the risks of self-serving
justification and failure to pay heed to the base rate of investment success. 262
On the other hand, experts may suffer more from overoptimism and heuristics
when applying their expertise in areas outside their primary area. 263 Without
some underlying theory of biases, we cannot say whether the magnitude of
biases afflicting experts is greater (or lesser) than the biases of ordinary
investors. Absent the ability to distinguish among investors, crafting regulatory
responses to behavioral biases becomes a guessing game.264
One response might be that all investors are equally behaviorally
challenged and thus equally in need of regulatory intervention. 265 Alternatively,
one might contend that, as a normative matter, we should target our regulatory
efforts to protect those least cognitively able. Distinguishing among investors
then becomes a nonissue (as all regulatory protections focus on the least able
regardless of the actual sophistication of particular investors). We think that
this response ignores a number of potential costs.
First, even inexperienced and cognitively challenged investors are capable
of learning. Once freed of the responsibility and discipline of making
investment decisions, investors lose the feedback mechanism that facilitates
such learning. Indeed, some investors may come to believe (overoptimistically)
that regulatory protections fully insulate them from investment risks. When this
is not true (and even merit regulation cannot eliminate all investment risks)
investors with overconfidence in the power of regulation will then take even
less care and may face a greater risk of facing large financial losses as a result.
Second, supplanting markets limits the ability of investors to ameliorate the
effects of ill-conceived forms of regulation, leading to higher error costs. Merit
regulation and other means of restricting choices curtail investment options in
the United States. As an alternative, U.S. investors and issuers may attempt to
engage in capital market transactions outside the United States. Both U.S.
issuers and investors, however, face higher transaction costs in finding overseas
262. Heath et al., supra note 98, at 1, 6 (citation omitted).
263. Griffin & Tversky, supra note 28, at 430 (showing that experts tend to be more
overconfident in their predictions than laypeople).
264. Cf Choi, supra note 66, at 310-19 (advancing proposals to distinguish investors
based on licensing exams and to allow investors some degree of choice in their own self-
classification).
265. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1450 ("[M]any if not most investors, even with
more information, will be unable to adequately protect themselves under [an issuer choice
regime].").
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markets in which to transact, plus the potential for foreign securities regulations
that conflict with the demands of U.S. regulatory requirements.
Finally, regulations that remove choice from investors also risk the one-
way ratchet effect. Markets work, but not if regulation chokes them. Once
regulations supplant the market, investors' decisionmaking skills may atrophy.
Intermediaries that aid investors may exit the market. If regulations leave
investors incapable of protecting themselves and thwart institutions that could
help, regulatory protections that were originally unwarranted may become
essential. Before regulators trigger this self-fulfilling scenario of investor
dependency, regulators should overcome a strong presumption against
interventions that remove choice.
2. Adjusting existing securities regulation.
Regulators may account for behavioral biases in other ways. In particular,
regulators may adjust the contours of existing regulatory provisions to
counteract cognitive illusions. While intervention of this sort will not eliminate
investment options completely, it may hinder (greatly) such choices. We
propose that intervention into the contours of existing securities regulation, to
correct for behavioral biases, must overcome a medium presumption under
which regulators must show a substantial likelihood of net benefits.
While current securities regulations cover many facets of the securities
markets, here we discuss three: the definition of materiality, antifraud liability,
and the gun-jumping rules for registered public offerings. Disclosure forms the
central focus of most of the federal securities laws. In a public offering, issuers
must put together a registration statement for filing with the SEC and must
distribute a statutory prospectus widely to the securities market as part of the
offering. 266 Most publicly traded issuers also must comply with periodic
disclosure filing requirements. 267 From a behavioral perspective, however,
disclosure risks confusing investors already suffering from bounded rationality,
availability, and hindsight.
266. See Cox ET AL., supra note 256, at 211-321.
267. The Exchange Act imposes periodic information reporting requirements for
certain issuers, commonly known as "Exchange Act reporting companies." Companies listed
on a national securities exchange as well as companies whose total assets exceed $10 million
and have a class of equity security (other than an exempted security) held of record by more
than 500 shareholders, among others, must register and comply with the SEC's periodic
information disclosure requirements, and must register the securities under the Exchange Act
and thereby come under the periodic reporting requirements of § 13(a). See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(b), 12(g), 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), 781(g), 78m(a) (2003);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2003) (raising asset requirement to $10 million). These
required periodic information filings include annual Form 10-K, quarterly Form 10-Q, and
occasional Form 8-K documents. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-l
(2003) (providing rules on periodic disclosure requirements of Exchange Act registered
companies); 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2003) (Exchange Act Form 10-K); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308
(2003) (Exchange Act Form 8-K); 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2003) (Exchange Act Form 10-Q).
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This risk of confusion calls into question the threshold materiality
requirement used throughout the securities laws' disclosure provisions. 268
Current securities regulations take an objective approach, defining materiality
in terms of what information a reasonable investor would want in light of the
total mix of information presently available in the market. 269 If many investors
suffer from behavioral biases, the "reasonable" investor becomes more difficult
to identify. But how would we alter the standard? If investors are easily led
astray by overoptimism, then perhaps a broader definition of materiality is
required. For example, the definition might be expanded to include "puffery"
that could trigger overoptimism. 270 On the other hand, bounded rationality
implies that investors will have limited attention spans-requiring more
disclosure may cause them to ignore more important information.27 1 Indeed,
armed with an overconfident sense of his ability to digest mountains of
disclosure, an investor may miss important aspects of disclosure. 272 Bounded
rationality may therefore lead one to recommend a narrower concept of
materiality for securities disclosure to reduce the amount of information given
to investors. 273
Adjusting information disclosure to ameliorate behavioral biases of
investors is a difficult and error-prone task. Moreover, limiting information
flows for the benefit of the behaviorally challenged will undermine the ability
of more rational investors to value securities accurately. The result could be
diminished securities market efficiency. Reduced market efficiency may then
increase the risk to investors of putting money into new securities offerings,
raising the cost of capital and thereby constricting the range of available
268. Rule 408 of the Securities Act, for example, provides: "In addition to the
information expressly required to be included in a registration statement, there shall be added
such further material information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading." 17
C.F.R. § 230.408 (2003).
269. See TSC Indus. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
270. Many courts today exclude puffery from the definition of materiality. See
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Jennifer O'Hare, The
Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the Puffery Defense in Private
Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1697 (1998) (arguing that "courts have
misused the puffery defense and have improperly insulated companies from civil liability for
their misrepresentations").
271. Robert Prentice notes "that investors typically do not read disclosure documents
when investing in securities." Prentice, supra note 14, at 1456; see also DAVID A.
HIRSHLEIFER, SONYA SEONGYEON LIM & SlEw HONG TEOH, DISCLOSURE TO A CREDULOUS
AUDIENCE: THE ROLE OF LIMITED ATTENTION (Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2002-3, 2002),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=344160 (modeling the
impact of limited attention on the part of investors on the incentives of firms to disclose
information).
272. See Daniel et al., supra note 19, at 60 ("Greater disclosure is not an unalloyed
virtue, because investors can lose the forest for the trees.").
273. This narrower conception is embodied today within the buried facts doctrine. See
supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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investment opportunities for investors.
Closely related to disclosure are the various antifraud provisions of the
securities laws. 2 74 Stringent antifraud provisions (and accompanying private
and public enforcement) help ensure that the disclosures made to investors are
truthful and accurate. Even if investors cannot process information rationally,
the threat of private litigation and public enforcement may deter fraud and
opportunistic behavior. As with disclosure, materiality forms a key component
of antifraud liability. 27 5 Regulators attempting to expand the definition of
materiality to take into account the range of behavioral biases may fail to gauge
accurately the extent of such biases. Expanding the materiality concept may
also lead to more frivolous lawsuits, thereby impairing the value of antifraud
liability as a deterrent against fraud.2 76 Firms may also reduce their disclosures
in an effort to avoid their exposure to fraud suits. Both frivolous suits and
reduced disclosure will raise the cost of capital, once again resulting in fewer
investment opportunities for investors.277
Another concern with altering antifraud standards to accommodate
cognitive biases is that corporate managers and accountants may not engage in
fraud consciously. Fraud traditionally requires scienter. Misleading
information, however, may be the byproduct of the cognitive failings of
managers and accountants and their organizations. The tendency toward
274. For an overview of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws, see Cox ET
AL., supra note 256, at 589-649, 681-774.
275. Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person "to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ......
(assuming the other requirements of Rule lob-5 are met). Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-
5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003).
276. For a summary of the frivolous lawsuit literature, see James Bohn & Stephen
Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 903, 918-23 (1996).
277. Another complication for strategies to alter the materiality standard to correct
behavioral biases is that many biases may vary in intensity and impact with the market
context. See, e.g., Arlen et al., supra note 29, at 33 (reporting evidence that the endowment
effect varies by context). Reported instances of fraud, for example, may be particularly
salient information for investors attempting to gauge market risks. Investors suffering from
the availability heuristic, however, will draw inappropriate inferences from the revelation of
fraud. When an Enron-type situation is disclosed, investors may overreact, withdrawing too
much money from the markets. Conversely, when no major frauds have been disclosed
recently, investors may be too sanguine about their investments. Regulators attempting to
correct for such fluctuations in the views of investors may be tempted to change the
antifraud and disclosure regimes to accommodate this variation. Materiality, for example,
could be expanded to cover a wider range of information in times when investor confidence
is low to induce more capital flow into the market. Such constant accommodation, however,
is an enormous task-and therefore subject to a much greater degree of error (and possible
investor confusion as the standards for antifraud liability change). On the other hand, the
fraud regime may in fact already vary implicitly on the salience of recent fraud without any
intervention by regulators, if highly publicized fraud makes jurors more willing to impose
liability on businesses. See Orey & Geyelin, supra note 69.
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overoptimism may result in a cascade of only optimistic information from the
bottom of a corporate hierarchy to the top, magnifying the positive aspects of
information flows perhaps to the point of becoming materially misleading. 27 8
But if corporate managers and accountants are themselves led by their own
cognitive defects to mislead investors, what can antifraud liability do about
it?279 Presumably a person is not intentionally misleading anyone if he is
making false statements under the influence of a cognitive defect (for example,
due to irrational overoptimism). 280 Even recklessness would seem a stretch: If
cognitive defects, such as irrational optimism, are pervasive, then a false
statement that resulted from such a defect could not be an extreme departure
from the standard of ordinary care because ordinary care would arguably
encompass the cognitive defect. Changing the standard of antifraud liability to
strict liability is no answer. Cognitive defects may be extremely difficult to
overcome, in which case liability would serve little purpose in changing
behavior.28 1 Expanding liability for misstatements would simply transfer
money from corporations and their managers to investors and lawyers, with no
reduction in fraud. The net result would be to increase the cost of investment. If
anything, the lessons of the behavioralists may favor protecting defendants by
raising the standards for establishing liability.282 Overconfident plaintiffs'
lawyers may be bringing suits with little chance of success, 283 and corporate
defendants may be overestimating the risk of liability given the salience of the
occasional large verdict in this area, such as the recent $3 billion payout by
Cendant.284 If such is the case, then the net result could very well be a general
278. See Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 89, at 120-22 (stating that "[t]he
difficulty, of course, is that if material information must pass through a number of relay
points in a hierarchy, the message can change (and lose accuracy) in the process").
279. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 13, at 1057 n. 165 ("Managerial decisionmaking biases
will not disappear simply because the state adopts a mandatory disclosure regime.").
280. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 15, at 158 ("If we are
seriously interested in deterring corporate deception, then fraud liability should not turn on
conscious awareness by the specific senior executives responsible for corporate
communications of the misleading nature of their misstatements or omissions.").
281. Cf Sale, supra note 227, at 919 ("People facing high-risk situations, are more
likely to gamble on a risky outcome than to accept the loss upfront. 'Rational' or not, their
commitment to the situation escalates, sunk costs dominate, and the ability to pull back and
reexamine the situation is diminished.").
282. Cf Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 89, at 162 (pointing out that the
"puffery" doctrine allows courts "to weed out-without the need for fact-intensive discovery
into corporate state of mind-the kinds of cases where optimistic bias, rather than intentional
deceit, is particularly likely to have driven the allegedly misleading disclosure").
283. See Langevoort, Ego, supra note 83, at 862-63 ("But as often as not, I suspect,
lawyers bringing low-merit suits have an honest but nonetheless self-serving assessment of
those merits. Once committed to the claims, they are motivated to consider them legitimate,
if not clear-cut winners.").
284. See Jolls et al., supra note 31, at 1525 ("In a case in which the threat of being
found liable is highly salient, individuals may tend to overestimate the likelihood of being
sanctioned.") (emphasis added).
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chilling of corporate speech.
The "gun-jumping" rules are another area that might be reconsidered.
Companies going public must go through a tightly controlled process when
making a public offering. Under the gun-jumping rules, companies must avoid
"conditioning" the market during the period prior to the filing of the
registration statement with the SEC.285 The behavioralist critique might suggest
even more stringent limitations on preoffering disclosures by companies to
curtail the tendency of investors to go into a "frenzy" over an upcoming public
offering. If investors are prone to overconfidence and overoptimism, even the
most routine disclosures could generate an overly enthusiastic response and
thereby condition the market. Taking behavioral law and economics into
account, therefore, could further reduce the disclosure of material information
during the quiet period. The reduction of information again may have negative
effects on overall market efficiency, raising the cost of capital and restricting
investment choices for investors.
In sum, regulatory adjustments to materiality, antifraud, and the gun-
jumping rules to address behavioral biases may do as much harm as good to the
market. Moreover, many of the regulatory responses may perversely result in
higher costs generally for investors and issuers, reducing the number of
investment options available for investors. 2 86 For these reasons, regulators
should show a substantial likelihood of net benefits before adjusting the
contours of current securities regulations to correct cognitive biases.
3. Influencing investors.
Regulators might instead modify the decisionmaking environment for
investors. Efforts to improve investors' decisions should only overcome a weak
presumption, requiring a showing of the likelihood of net benefits. To be sure,
even these milder interventions to correct cognitive errors pose risks. If
"debiasing" investors proves ineffective, we worry that little stands in the way
of regulators moving incrementally toward more interventionist and costly
approaches.
If the greatest harm from cognitive biases and speculation stems from
investors investing too quickly and trading too much, perhaps regulators should
285. See Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are in
Registration, Release No. 5180, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 3056 (Aug. 16, 1971) (listing
rationale of gun-jumping rules to stop the conditioning of the market).
286. As with interventions that displace the market, overly strict regulations may cause
market participants to adjust in ways that further entrench those regulations. Regulating to
accommodate biases may undermine the efforts of investors to learn and adjust for their
biases, making otherwise unnecessary regulatory interventions indispensable. Reducing
mandatory disclosure to take into account behavioral biases may generate new norms in the
market around this lower level of disclosure. Expanding the definition of "conditioning" the
market under the gun-jumping rules may similarly affect market norms, reducing the
pressure to undo even ill-conceived regulations.
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simply discourage trading. One path to encouraging a more "rational"
decisionmaking environment would be to impose trading delays on
investors. 28 7 With a trading delay, investors would have more time to
contemplate their decision. Investors might recognize their behavioral biases
during that "cooling off' period and thereby engage in more rational
decisionmaking. 288 Trading delays do pose the risk of increasing transaction
costs for investors. Investors that profit from the ability to trade instantly on
new information may bear particularly high costs from trading delays (thus
discouraging investments in obtaining timely information). Nevertheless, short
trading delays do not preclude investors from constructing their chosen
portfolio. The market may also react to lessen the cost of delays imposed on
trading decisions. Investors who need to trade for long term planning purposes,
such as tax considerations or tuition bills, may simply initiate their trades
sooner than they otherwise would.
Trading delays, however, are not a panacea. Trading delays may encourage
impatience instead of diminishing overconfidence. Moreover, it is unclear
whether trading delays will generate more informed decisionmaking or simply
higher transaction costs. 289 If people are incapable of recognizing their own
biases, they may experience considerable disutility from intervention intended
to correct those biases. Worse yet, if we succeed in discouraging people from
speculative trading and/or discourage investors with behavioral biases from
trading, do we also run the risk of discouraging them from participating in the
stock market entirely? The speculator might be better off if he traded less, but
would he be better off with his money in a passbook savings account? Perhaps
a little speculation is needed to encourage investment over consumption. And
the liquidity produced by speculative trading does lower execution costs for
investors who need to trade for liquidity reasons. Discouraging speculation
could force investors into black market alternatives, such as offshore accounts
that allowed them to trade more often.
287. For a discussion on the ability of trading delays (preceded by information
disclosure) to reduce the advantage of informed traders in the markets, see Ian Ayres &
Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REv. 313, 394-401 (2002).
288. Alternatively, regulators may deter overly optimistic investors from engaging in
excessive trades through a trading tax. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb
Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 101 (1989) (making the case for taxing
speculative securities transactions); Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When
Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transaction Tax, 3 J.
FIN. SERV. RES. 261 (1989) (same). But see Joseph A. Grundfest & John B. Shoven, Adverse
Implications of a Securities Transactions Excise Tax, 6 J. AcCT. AUDITING & FN. 409
(1991) (arguing against a tax on securities transactions).
289. Others have put forth recommendations for "debiasing" human decisionmakers in
the jury context (with respect in particular to the hindsight bias). See Hal R. Arkes,
Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to Legal Proceedings, 7
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429, 450-51 (1989). These attempts, however, have not met with much
success. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post Not Ex Ante: Determining
Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 99 (1995).
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Education can also influence investors' decisions. Perhaps disclosure-
particularly if focused on relative investment performance-can educate
investors and thereby reduce the overall level of irrationality in the securities
markets.290 Learning and feedback may also help to diminish the impact of
cognitive biases. 29 1 Studies in other areas of cognition have shown that
participants, when told to consider the perspective of other parties or to
consider the likelihood of alternative outcomes, have mitigated the effect of
certain biases. 292 Of course, little can help the intractably irrational. But
investors need not be free of cognitive biases, just aware of their own
deficiencies. Regulators could educate investors and train them to avoid
behavioral pitfalls.
Despite the positive arguments in favor of minimal intervention to educate
and caution investors to correct for behavioral biases, we still argue for a weak
presumption against their use. The silence of the SEC on the well-documented
advantages of passive investing for the small investor is deafening. We have
little confidence that the SEC will soon see the light and begin to discourage
small investors from picking their own stocks, thereby incurring the wrath (and
lobbying clout) of the investment industry. A more likely scenario is
educational interventions to promote "more rational" active investing.
A weak presumption discourages regulatory interventions that serve little
useful purpose. Some of the biases identified by behavioral scholars appear to
be beyond regulatory intervention. For example, commentators have cited the
tendency for stock prices to go up on sunny days in New York and decline on
290. See James Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision
and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998) (arguing for the
importance of investor education on saving, investing, and financial fraud); see also PETER
SEDLMEIER, IMPROVING STATISTICAL REASONING: THEORETICAL MODELS AND PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS (1999) (reporting evidence on the effectiveness of training in statistical
reasoning). But see Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 840-42 (2000) (criticizing the SEC's educational efforts).
291. See Mitchell, supra note 33, at 31-40 (summarizing studies showing the ability of
learning to improve decisionmaking).
292. See Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 115 (1997) (noting that having
disputants write down arguments convincingly for their opponent's side reduced the
discrepancy in expectations of the two sides in dispute); D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J.
Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25
DECISION SCI. 401, 401-14 (finding evidence that having jurors consider alternative possible
outcomes reduces the hindsight bias). Nonetheless, a question remains whether people can
self-correct for biases even when aware of their biases. See id. at 115 (noting that in their
experiment on parties in dispute "being informed of the bias had no effect on the discrepancy
of the parties' expectations, nor on the likelihood of settlement"); see also Neal R.
Feigenson, Accidents as Melodrama, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 741, 781 n.131 (1999-2000)
(explaining that "jurors cannot simply debias themselves from being influenced by deep-
seated habits of thought. Even if they are aware of those habits of thought, they may lack the
motivation or the tools to correct properly for what they perceive to be a bias in their
thinking").
[Vol. 56:1
October 2003] BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE SEC
overcast days. 293 Should we therefore close the markets on cloudy days? As far
as we know, the SEC has no policies for modifying the weather in New York.
This amusing example raises a broader point. Finance professors apparently
have the time and inclination to do the data mining necessary to identify such
anomalies. Financial professionals may do likewise. Arbitrage may then
eventually eliminate the impact of behavioral biases on stock market prices
(although new anomalies may emerge). 2 94 But whether or not arbitrage
eliminates behavioral biases, many of the anomalies discovered are beyond the
power of regulation-public or private-to affect.29 5 Market actors may or may
not respond to these anomalies once they are identified. The question then
becomes whether we should lose sleep over them either way. A minimal
presumption against intervention screens out regulations intended to solve
problems that are not worth worrying about.
Proponents of bounded rationality may also worry that additional
information, even in the form of education about biases, may further confuse
investors. Investors already suffering from information overload may overreact
to information on their own biases, perhaps leading them to withdraw from
capital markets altogether.
We also question whether investor education will have much impact. On
the one hand, investor education provides little risk of regulatory error-many
investors may simply ignore erroneous or extraneous information. But investors
may also ignore even useful educational materials on cognitive biases. The
feature that makes investor education low risk also reduces its effectiveness in
ameliorating biases. Perhaps investors suffer from such overconfidence that
education will not dissuade them from making their own investment decisions.
Overconfident investors may (if they bother to read educational materials) still
believe that they are too "expert" to be overconfident. We have no doubt that
day traders display overconfidence and overoptimism. 296 But if their
speculative preference is sufficiently strong, passive alternatives that would
293. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1410 (citing David Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway,
Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and Weather, 58 J. FIN (forthcoming 2003)); see also
M.J. Kamstra, L.A. Kramer & M.D. Levi, Losing Sleep at the Market: The Daylight-Savings
Anomaly, 12 AM. EcoN. REV. 1005 (2000) (finding a relation between the switch to daylight
savings time and stock returns).
294. Indeed, at least one prominent behavioral economist has recently taken to
managing his own fund designed to take advantage of the behavioral quirks of other
investors. Richard Thaler is a partner at Fuller & Thaler Asset Management Inc. Thaler's
fund manages $1.4 billion in assets. Thaler describes his fund's approach as follows: "'We
just try to forecast the errors of others."' Mara Der Hovanesian, Don't Just Analyze the
Market, Analyze the Investor, Bus. WK., May 21, 2001, at 124.
295. Prentice also notes the salience of a given company may affect investment
decisions. See Prentice, supra note 14, at 1470. Once again, it is impossible to point to
anything that the SEC has done to address this "problem" or any explanation of how any
regulator could counteract this.
296. The market downturn appears to have trimmed their numbers. See Aaron Elstein,
supra note 41, at D4 (reporting a drop in full-time day traders from 20,000 to 7,500).
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curb their penchant for trading are unlikely to appeal to them. And then again,
maybe they will. Lacking a theory of biases, it's hard to make predictions
concerning the effect of policy proposals on investor behavior.
Even if investor education is effective at reducing biases, regulators may
not be the best source of that education. Sometimes nothing can substitute for
hard experience. An investor that consistently underperforms a salient and
easily accessible benchmark such as the S&P 500 index may eventually rethink
his strategy. Investors unable to make such adjustments may choose instead to
hire expertise-by purchasing index funds, investing through active mutual
funds, and investing only in companies with known reputations that trade on
nationally recognized exchanges (such as the NYSE). The "dumb money"
(such as this Article's authors) does just fine with its investments, once the
futility of trying to beat the market is recognized.
Mutual funds and investment advisors will also compete to educate the
less-than-rational about their behavioral problems to obtain the business of
even more investors. In fact, financial intermediaries, such as Fidelity, are
attempting to educate their investors about the risks that cognitive biases pose
for their investment decisionmaking. 297 The financial press also covers these
issues. 298 To be sure, intermediaries that promote active trading are unlikely to
disseminate empirical research that shows the unlikelihood of beating the
market. Other intermediaries, however, who promote passive alternatives will
have strong incentives to convince people of their behavioral fallibilities.
As Langevoort and others have pointed out, however, institutions may face
their own behavioral biases.29 9 Money managers may manage funds in a way
that leads to herding with other money managers. 300 To the extent that
managers fear sanctions for poor performance (for example, losing one's job)
more than they seek rewards for beating the average (for example, a higher
salary), money managers may stick close to the crowd of other managers.30 1
297. See Russ Banham, Mind Over Matter, FIDELITY OUTLOOK, Aug. 2002, at 14
(explaining how cognitive biases can impair investment returns and how to avoid them).
298. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins, How Could They Have Done It?, WALL ST. J., Aug.
28, 2002, at A15 (applying behavioral decision theory to meltdown of Enron); Mary
Rowland, Nobel Winner Unearths 5 Common Investing Mistakes, (Nov. 4, 2002), at
http://moneycentral.msn.com (reporting common investment mistakes identified by Nobel
prize winner Daniel Kahneman).
299. See supra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., David Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80
AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990); Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock
Prices, 54 J. FIN. 581 (1999); see also DAVID HIRSHLEIFER & SIEW HONG TEOH, HERD
BEHAVIOR AND CASCADING IN CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS, (Working
Paper, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=296081
(surveying empirical evidence on herding behavior by professional investors).
301. See Judith Chevailier & Glenn Ellison, Career Concerns of Mutual Fund
Managers, 114 Q.J. ECON. 389, 390-91 (1999) (reporting from their study of 453 portfolio
managers from the early 1990s that "we find that a young manager is more likely to be
terminated if his fund's sector weightings or unsystematic risk level deviates considerably
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And we cannot expect the investment industry to advise small investors to
make a wholesale conversion to passive investment strategies. Where are the
trading commissions and management fees in that?
Nonetheless, if the overall performance of funds exceeds the performance
of individual investors (although they may still trail the market averages after
expenses), mutual funds enhance investor welfare. The popularity of such funds
demonstrates that at least some investors prefer to delegate investment
decisionmaking to intermediaries with greater expertise. And some funds are
immune from the cognitive defects of money managers. In particular, index
funds provide an obvious alternative for investors seeking to avoid investment
mistakes. The pioneer in bringing this strategy to investors, Vanguard, now
boasts that one of its index funds is the largest mutual fund in the United
States. 3 02
In sum, once the language of behavioral bias becomes common, it is only a
short step to more interventionist responses to correct such biases.30 3 Given the
dangers of such responses, we think caution should apply even to limited forms
of debiasing efforts. While we see plausible arguments for why carefully
targeted education may benefit investors, we still think that even such limited
intervention should be justified by a showing of a likelihood of net benefit.
C. Applying the Framework
We limit our presumptions to changes to the existing securities regulatory
regime. Some of the present securities regulatory regime, of course, may
already take into account investors with cognitive limitations and biases. For
example, the buried fact doctrine of materiality addresses the bounded
rationality under which investors operate. 304 Applying our presumptions to
existing law nonetheless may result in overly large amounts of uncertainty (as
to what laws and regulations will fail to overcome the presumptions). The
existing regime also works reasonably well, and we favor a conservative
approach to guard against potential harmful changes to that regime.
Our framework for assessing regulatory responses to cognitive biases
focuses on two relevant factors: the identity of the regulatory decisionmaker
and the type of regulatory intervention. Our sliding scale approach is
necessarily incomplete. Other types of regulatory intervention to address
perceived behavioral biases among investors are undoubtedly possible. We
argue that a presumption of some form should exist against all regulatory
from the mean of the fund's objective group. Young managers may thus have an incentive to
herd .... ).
302. Information on Vanguard can be found at http://www.vanguard.com (last visited
Oct. 2, 2003).
303. Even small interventions in the market to correct for behavioral biases may
condition both regulators and the market to take into account behavioral biases.
304. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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interventions to counteract cognitive biases. Regulators suffer from their own
set of behavioral biases. Given the imprecise (and often contradictory) ways
behavioral biases may affect investors, the possibility of mistake is high.
Moreover, the costs of such mistakes are significant given the difficulty of
undoing regulations once they are put in place.
In applying the framework, care must be taken in balancing the two
identified factors. Only the strongest evidence can justify efforts by a
monopolistic SEC to remove investment choices altogether. At the other end of
the scale, initiatives by private securities exchanges (in competition with one
another) to educate investors about behavioral biases raise minimal concerns. A
harder choice exists when the SEC attempts to educate investors. And, attempts
by a securities exchange to supplant market decisionmakers present a similarly
difficult question. The risks of misguided and costly interventions to correct
cognitive biases are reduced in both situations and correspondingly less
justification should be required for such actions.
Ultimately, the notion of a framework for assessing regulatory
interventions to address cognitive biases must rely on some institution to apply
the presumptions. At a minimum, agencies and courts (as well as Congress)
should take caution in intervening to correct market behavioral biases,
potentially self-imposing our framework and providing some record of how
regulatory proposals meet the applicable presumption. Commentators
proposing policy changes should also take caution in attempting to remedy
market cognitive biases through regulatory intervention. For certain situations,
courts may apply the varying presumptions in reviewing agency regulations as
well as lower court decisions targeting market behavioral biases. Courts have
their own set of biases, but our proposal does not ask reviewing courts to revisit
de novo the decision on how to deal with investor biases. Rather, such courts
only must judge whether the regulatory decisionmaker in question has met its
burden of proof to overcome the relevant presumption. 305
One possible criticism of our proposal is that regulators determined to
fashion regulatory remedies targeting behavioral biases may do so without
stating that such biases are the basis for intervention. It is unclear, however,
why regulators would in fact desire to disguise their motivations. At least some
well-intentioned regulators should welcome the ability to provide rationales if
only to ensure (or disprove) whether in fact they are taking the correct
regulatory actions in a highly uncertain area. To be sure, not all regulators are
so candid. Regulators may seek to expand their regulatory authority and
prestige. But they may do so already without invoking behavioral biases. To
305. Of course, courts may also face the decision directly as to what to do about a
perceived behavioral bias (including, for example, whether the definition of materiality
should encompass investor cognitive defects). In such a situation, we have argued that courts
should face their own intermediate presumption against intervention to correct the bias. See
supra Part III.A.2. Such a presumption should be both self-imposed by the initial, deciding
lower court as well as applied by a higher level court reviewing the lower court.
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the extent regulators have already exhausted nonbehavioral justifications to
expand their regulatory authority, turning to these same justifications (even if
simply as a disguise for a behavioral bias-related justification) will not gain the
regulators any additional benefit. It is also possible that a well-intentioned
regulator may be overconfident in his or her own ability and correspondingly
distrustful of the ability of outsiders to know the best solution for behavioral
biases. Such a regulator may seek to disguise regulations targeting behavioral
biases. Additional barriers nonetheless exist against these backdoor attempts.
First, regulators must point to some rationale. And to the extent that other
rationales (including, for example, justifications that assume rational investors)
do not support a desired regulatory policy (such as merit regulation) then
regulators will lack the ability to push the reform forward. Second, reviewing
institutions (such as courts) may come to question overly vague rationales
(such as "investor confidence") regarding them as simple facades for
behavioral bias motivated regulation.
CONCLUSION
Questioning the assumption that investors act rationally with their
investments is an emerging trend in securities regulation scholarship. This trend
is likely to accelerate with the recent award of the Nobel Prize in Economics to
Daniel Kahneman, a pioneer in bringing psychology to the study of economic
behavior.306 The evidence that investors suffer from cognitive failings is
impressive. Investors satisfice and employ flawed heuristics. Investors may
also experience endowment effects, valuing a loss much greater than a
corresponding gain. Cognitive dissonance may then affect investors, leading
them to confirm the value of even poorly made decisions. Commentators have
seized upon the evidence that investors act with limited cognitive capacity to
justify regulatory intervention.
Given the array of biases presented, readers themselves may apply the
availability heuristic, placing too much weight on what can go wrong in
investing rather than weighing the overall evidence related to the ability of
investors.307 And evidence exists in fact that the securities markets in part
already have internalized and responded to the presence of behavioral biases.
Very few investors participate in active day trading, and increasing numbers of
investors put their savings into passive low cost and tax efficient index funds.
We find the insights of behavioral theory provocative. It is unclear,
however, what regulatory response is both necessary and plausible. Disclosure
is the primary tool of the present U.S. securities regulatory regime. Yet
306. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners For Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 10, 2002, at B 1.
307. See Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Lee Roy Beach, The Citation Bias: Fad and
Fashion in Judgment and Decision Literature, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 75 (1984) (arguing
that behavioral literature may unduly emphasize evidence of nonrational decisionmaking).
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disclosure is unlikely to help investors suffering from overconfidence, loss
aversion, and cognitive dissonance. One could imagine a more interventionist
regime, such as merit regulation. But merit regulation comes with a much
larger set of problems. The specter of regulators centrally planning investment
decisions does not bode well for the allocation of investment capital to its
highest valued uses.
Less intrusive regulatory alternatives carry their own risks. Regulators are
vulnerable to a wide range of behavioral contagion. Regulators may suffer from
overconfidence and process information with only bounded rationality.
Heuristics play a large role in how regulators make decisions. Even with
expertise, regulators may misapply heuristics across the spectrum of different
regulatory problems. Regulators may also suffer from confirmation bias,
supporting prior regulatory decisions whatever the wisdom of the decisions.
And in groups the decisionmaking of regulators may decline rather than
improve. On the one hand, groups and organizational structures may help
alleviate some of the mistakes that derive from individually biased decisions.
Studies of group decisionmaking provide evidence that the total can indeed be
greater than the sum of individuals in enhancing the accuracy of decisions. But
cognitive illusions may grip entire groups. Groupthink may also lead to an
uncritical acceptance of regulatory decisions.
If both investors and regulators operate under the influence of behavioral
biases, the value of regulation in correcting these biases comes into question. If
regulators are not well equipped to determine whether regulation will
counteract the biases facing investors, regulation may well do more harm than
good. Worse still, SEC regulators may suffer greater behavioral biases than
securities market participants. Investors that perform poorly will either learn
(and perhaps put their money into an index fund or otherwise hire expertise) or
exit the market. Private institutions face similar market pressures to serve the
interests of their client-investors or perish. Although some types of biases may
give institutions a competitive edge, the magnitude of such biases is limited by
the cost that they impose on investors. The market may not function perfectly,
but regulators under the present regime face no such pressures. To the extent
regulators themselves make the decision whether to intervene into markets, the
risk of ill-conceived intervention is even more acute. We therefore propose a
framework for assessing regulatory interventions to correct for behavioral
biases.
The appropriate presumption against regulation varies with the type of
regulator and form of regulation. Certain types of regulators, including private
securities exchanges and other competitive regulators, and certain forms of
intervention, including investor education, pose a much lower risk of error.
Despite their behavioral biases, regulators may have a role to play in
channeling market forces toward achieving the best level of investor protection.
In addition to serving as a source of investor education, regulators may oversee
competition among private regulators such as exchanges to help counteract
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behavioral biases within the exchanges. While competition will weed out some
biases, having to answer to monitoring regulators may further weed out biases
among self-regulatory organizations.
We offer only tentative solutions to the problem of behavioral biases
among securities regulators. The insights of behavioral law and economics are
limited by the lack of a general theory to explain why the human mind results
in behavioral biases in decisionmaking. Without such a theory, assessing
possible methods for ameliorating such biases is a murky task at best. It is
considerably clearer that focusing on biases among investors, while ignoring
equivalent or worse biases among regulators, will lead to excessive regulatory
intervention. Our contribution in this Article is to balance the behavioral
critique of investors with one of regulators.
